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***Consociational Power Sharing Arrangements as a Tool for Democracy:
The Experiences of Macedonia and Kosovo***

Abstract: *The protection of the different communities involved in the ethnic conflicts and power sharing arrangements among them have become necessary corollaries to democracy in the western Balkan region. In the case of Macedonia and Kosovo, power sharing arrangements have been imposed by the international actors through the peace agreements, in order to initially reach the goal of establishing peace in the countries. However the establishment of real democratic participation through power sharing settlements still remains a prerogative. Based on the analysis of the different power sharing mechanisms adopted by Macedonia and Kosovo, the article provides evidences that incrementing the political participation of the different communities in the central and local state institutions helps countries to decrease the tensions between host state and main non dominant group. The paper also demonstrates that by sharing the power between the several groups present on the territory, leads to a consociational democratic participation form.*

Keywords: Minorities; Power sharing; Consociationalism; Macedonia; Kosovo; Kin State; Host State.

Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and of the RFY, the lack of contrast between the liberal and communist ideologies, accompanied with an increasing confidence in the ethno-linguistic affiliation state, culminated with several ethnic conflicts and civil wars, especially in the western Balkan area. Hence, the protection of the different communities involved in the conflicts and power sharing among them have become a compulsory corollaries to democracy. For a long time, international community mediators and facilitators, through the peace agreements reached or “imposed” in the area, have been involved in the first stage of power sharing with the aim to establish peace in the region.

The different States that came up after the fall of the communist block have formally applied for EU membership. Before joining the EU prospective applicants have to meet the so-called Copenhagen criteria. They are also required under the EU conditionality, to

change their policies in order to be eligible for EU admission.¹ Minority rights protection have become a central issue, a parameter through which to measure the “democratization” and the political stability of the applicant State.

The guiding principle of equal power-sharing among conflicting groups, in a second phase, needs to be legitimated through democratic participation into democratic and independent institutions. While it is still not clear what a minority is,² since the beginning of the Balkan wars (1990-1998) it comes up with clarity that ethnic power sharing and territorial autonomy often have to go along. This is the case of the different entities that form the BiH union, but also the case of territorial decentralization as in Macedonia and in Kosovo. Thus, minority rights, political power sharing and forms of territorial autonomy in Macedonia and Kosovo will be taken in consideration in the present research paper in order to analyze how the “second phase” of power sharing, dealing with the implementation of the reached peace agreements, is being translated into democratic institutions.

Although we acknowledge that it is not possible here to deal comprehensively with all the elements and forms of power sharing, the present paper examines the constitutional plan for power sharing in each of the two countries. On the other side, the bargaining power of the minority groups depends on the host state and kin state role; thus, this further aspect will be also taken in consideration.

¹ On the EU conditionality, see L. APPICCIAFUOCO, *Integrazione dei Balcani occidentali nell'Unione europea e principio di condizionalità*, in «Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo», 2, 2007, pp. 547-582.

² For the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a minority is: «A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language». *United Nations Human Rights, Minorities Under International Law*, in <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationalaw.aspx>. For a controversial vision of the term minority, see: G. POGGESCHI, *Language Rights: A Comparative Analysis* (I diritti linguistici. Un'analisi comparata), Roma, Carocci, 2010, pp. 25-27; F. PALERMO - J. WOLEK, *Comparative Constitutional Law of Groups and Minorities* (Diritto costituzionale comparato dei gruppi e delle minoranze), Padova, CEDAM, 2011, pp. 11-34.

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1. *Power Sharing as a Tool for Democracy*

Both the Ohrid Peace Agreement and the Ahtisaari Proposal for Kosovo (CSP)³ foresee elements of consociational power sharing aiming to accommodate, first of all, the principal non dominant group claims in both countries: Albanians in Macedonia and Serbs in Kosovo. Before stopping on the specific mechanisms of sharing the power in both countries, some general considerations are needed.

Scholars⁴ have appointed that consociational power sharing consist in a range of measures that aim to accommodate ethnic diversity in divided societies. While a complete and comprehensive definition of minority is still lacking,⁵ since the beginning of the Balkan wars (1990-1998) it comes up with clarity that power sharing and territorial autonomy often have to go along. This is the case of the different entities that form the BiH union, but also the case of territorial decentralization in Macedonia and in Kosovo.

It must be stressed that more than ethnic power sharing, the western Balkan experience shows that the play is between (national) minorities that have a significant number population, mostly concentrated in a territory (when they form the majority of the population) near the boundaries' of their kin state. Thus, if at the beginning the power sharing arrangements have been foreseen as a mechanism of consociational arrangements, their implementation suffers from the “leverage power” of the main non dominant ethnic group. Such situation, in a first phase, can change the features from a consociational to a pure dualistic system.

³ Power sharing arrangements existed also in the 2001 Constitutional Framework of Kosovo but the present article will focus only on the power sharing arrangements of the CSP and the 2008 Constitution.

⁴ See F. BIEBER, *Power Sharing after Yugoslavia: Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo*, in S. NOEL, eds., *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, pp. 85-104.

⁵ An “open” and well-formulated definition is that of R. TONIATTI, *Minoranze e minoranze protette*, in T. BONAZZI - M. DUNNE, eds., *Cittadinanza e diritti nelle società multiculturali* (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1994, p. 283), which holds that «minorities as such do not exist. Instead there are social groups – each endowed with its own identity – small and large, with many members and few members». For more on the problem of definitions, see, among others, G. PENTASSUGLIA, *Minorities in International Law* Strasbourg/Flensburg, Council of Europe and ECMI, 2002, p. 15 sgg.; T.W. SIMON, *Ethnic Identity and Minority Protection: Designation, Discrimination, and Brutalization*, Plymouth, UK, Lexington Books, 2012, pp. 69-81.

The consociational model theorized by Lijphart⁶ is defined by four basic characteristics: 1) grand coalition – the political leaders of all significant communities are included in the executive; 2) all relevant groups are proportionally represented in the parliament and public administration; 3) veto rights in matters of vital interests; 4) segmental autonomy. The main idea is that only by sharing the power between the main ethnic groups and accommodating the ethnic diversity by democratic participation into state institutions, multiethnic states will reach stability.

The western Balkans experience has shown that if at the beginning the consociational power sharing guidelines have been drawn in the Peace Agreements by the international actors, subsequently consociational settlements have to be negotiated. Practice shows that what mostly influences the power sharing arrangements is the political participation of the minorities, which at the beginning suffers from the numeric and nationalist situation of the “main” non-dominant ethnic group, whose members will vote (at least in the first phase) exclusively for their ethnic parties.

In this step, the lobbying role of the kin state becomes a crucial factor for the negotiation power of the minority community. If the kin state assumes an intervention role, the political leaders of the minority community tend to radicalize their claims in the host state. The example in this case may be offered by the Serb community in Kosovo, whose leaders intensity claims over that Kosovo’s government depend on the Belgrade’s politic: more intensive is the intervention role of Belgrade in the Serbian enclaves (by enforcing the parallel structures) more incentivized are Serbian minority political elites to play the “Serbian nationalist card” aiming to gain more electoral votes.

As stated above, ordinarily the power sharing arrangements are designed for the accommodation of the principal non dominant group claims⁷ in order to own equally and proportionally seats in the parliament, and to have the possibility to use veto power

⁶ See A. LIJPHART, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven, CT and London, Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 25-44.

⁷ For a long time the minority policy and the minority question in Serbia has been identified with the Kosovo issue, since 1999 the minority issue in Kosovo has been identified with the Serbian community demands and since 2001 the minority issue in Macedonia goes along with the Albanian community claims. The destiny of the other communities suffers the solution of the most numerous (problematic) minority claims.

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more convincingly. This could be translated in political and legislative stalemate for the host State.

While what is observed in practice in the Macedonian case, the Ohrid Agreement did not establish reserved seats for each minority, instead, it offers collective rights for all minority groups, but *de facto* the required 20% is possible only for the Albanians. Such situation instead of the desirable consociationalism between the different communities led to a dualism between Albanian and Macedonian parties which are increasingly becoming national parties. The requested “double majority” becomes an exclusive veto power of the Albanian community.

In order to overcome this situation, the only possibility for the host state remains the necessity to increase the political participation of the other minority communities. In the Kosovo case the political participation of the different minority groups is safeguarded by the established minimum strict quotas; in the Macedonian case a similar situation was advanced by the central government in the 2007 law proposal.

Incrementing the political participation of the different communities in the central and local state institutions, helps in decreasing the tensions between host state and main non dominant group. Moreover by sharing the power between the several groups on the territory, will lead toward a consociational democratic participation form. The impossibility for minor ethnic political parties to pass the required percentage foreseen by the electoral laws, incite political elites to form alliances between them. In the long lasting period, the necessary consociational political parties that will be formed by these alliances, will be traduced in a decreasing confidence of the population in the ethnic parties and in an increasing entrust in parties with a more comprehensive national breathing.

2. Ethnic Composition and Power Sharing in Kosovo

At the end of negotiations to settle its status, Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, ending nine years’ of endeavor since the beginning of the war in 1999, to resolve its status. Power sharing between the two main communities, Albanians and Serbs, has been a leitmotiv enshrined in all international plans and acts that concerns

with the Kosovo issue,⁸ and it is still one of the main issues in the ongoing talks between Pristina and Belgrade.⁹

Power sharing and territorial decentralization, as foreseen in the Ahtisaari plan,¹⁰ are enshrined in the Constitution¹¹ and in other relevant local laws.¹² Moreover, Article 143 of the Constitution states that the Constitution itself and other legal acts of Kosovo shall be interpreted in compliance with the CSP and in case of inconsistency the latter (CSP) shall prevail.

The Constitution addresses the multi-ethnic nature of the new state.¹³ The term community is used to refer to the different minorities living in the territory. The main ethnic groups living in Kosovo are: Albanians (over 90% of the population), Serbs (5%), Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians - REA, Bosnians, Gorani, Turks, Croats and Montenegrins (5%). Community rights in the legislative process are protected by the Constitution. In order to implement national-level integration, the Constitution, in accordance with the CSP provisions, established that at least 20 of the 120 seats of the Assembly of Kosovo should be reserved for the representatives of non-majority communities: 10 seats are reserved to the Serb community, 1 for the Roma, 1 for the

⁸ With the Kumanovo Agreement signed between NATO and the RFY, the war in Kosovo ended on 9 June 1999. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, placed Kosovo under the UNMIK administration. On 15 May 2001 a “Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo” was approved.

⁹ On this, see E. CUKANI, *Ongoing Pristina-Belgrade Talks: From Decentralization to Regional Cooperation and Future Perspectives*, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers-EDAP, 4, 2012, in www.eurac.edu/edap.

¹⁰ Ahtisaari developed the CSP (Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement) during the Vienna negotiations and the proposal was presented to Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February 2007. Even if the proposal did not explicitly include independence, it opened the way for the future independence of Kosovo. High level talks took place in March 2007, and in the same year Ahtisaari presented his final proposals to the UN Security Council, including a recommendation for Kosovo’s independence for a specified period of international supervision. This final proposal, accepted by Pristina and refused by Belgrade, met the strong opposition of Russia. Under the threat of a Russian veto, the UN Security General launched another time limited round of negotiations led by a troika of US, EU and Russian negotiators. When the Troika’s negotiations closed without any result on 10 December 2007, under the threat of Russia’s UN veto power, Kosovo’s leaders declared unilateral independence on 17 February 2008. Full text of the proposal is in <http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html>.

¹¹ The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on 9 April 2008, came into force on 15 June of the same year, after the end of the transitional period.

¹² *The Law on Local Self-Government*, n. 3/L-040, specifically determines the “decentralization of the powers” from central to local governments or from the matrix to the new municipalities. The full text of the law is in http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-L040_en.pdf.

¹³ See Articles 3, 5, 6, Chapter 1 of the Constitution.

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Ashkaly, 1 for the Egyptian community, 3 for the Bosnian community, 2 for the Turkish one, and 1 for the Gorani community.¹⁴

Power sharing is reflected also in the Government composition: the Serb community will be represented at least by one minister, and another one from the non-majority community, and if the Kosovo government has more than 12 ministers, three must be appointed from communities. In addition, it is foreseen the presence of 2 Deputy ministers from the Serb community and 2 other Deputy Ministers from the non-majority communities.¹⁵

Furthermore, in the judicial system as a tool for increasing integration: 15% of the judges at the Supreme Court of Kosovo should be from the minority communities¹⁶ the same percentage is foreseen also for the composition of any other court established with appeal jurisdiction.¹⁷ In accordance with the importance of community rights in Kosovo, Article 78 of the Constitution requires the creation of the Assembly Committee on the Rights and Interests of Communities. Additionally, in case of legislation of vital interest it is required a double majority in order to adopt, amend or repeal certain issues of particular interest, that is, both the Assembly majority and the majority of the deputies holding seats guaranteed for communities.¹⁸

At the local level, if at least 10% of the residents belong to communities not in majority in those municipalities, a post should be reserved to the vice president of the Municipal Assembly for Communities for a representative of these communities.¹⁹ Undoubtedly, the size of the minority community is an important benchmark in influencing the determination of power-sharing, but sometimes, more than numbers, what mostly influences the determination of the power to be share (ex. seats reserved in the several institutions) are the historical and political matters.

Even the Serb community in Kosovo is only 5% of the total number, as it has been

¹⁴ See Article 64, Chapter IV, Constitution of Kosovo.

¹⁵ See Article 96, Chapter VI, *ibid.*

¹⁶ Article 103.3 states: «At least fifteen per cent (15%) of the judges of the Supreme Court, but not fewer than three (3) judges, shall be from Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo». *Ibid.*

¹⁷ See Article 103. 6, *ibid.*

¹⁸ See Article 81, *ibid.*

¹⁹ See Article 62, *ibid.*

underlined in all legal acts, they have more power compared to the other communities. Indeed it must be stressed that the minority agenda in the case of Kosovo has been identified with the issues between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs which continue to derecognize each other like the predominant population.²⁰ Such confusion is fed by the role hired by the host state and the kin state. In the Kosovo's case, even the Serbian state does not recognize Kosovo like an independent republic,²¹ the "arm wrestling" is for more territorial autonomy in areas where the Serb community constitutes the majority.

In conclusion, it must be highlighted that the several criteria as foreseen in the implementation of the decentralization, makes such process more similar to the federal than to the consociational model.²²

3. *Ethnic Composition and Power Sharing in Macedonia*

After the dissolution of RFY, the 1991 Constitution defined Macedonia as the "nation-state of Macedonians"²³ thus marginalizing the other communities like Turks, Roma, Serbs and Muslims, but above all by rising discontentment among the large Albanian minority community. Concomitantly with the war in Kosovo, on 2001 veins outside the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA), the advanced demand for self-determination and the ethnic conflicts brought the Macedonian ethnic issue under the attention of the international community.

Under the international mediation and the coordination of Robert Badinter on August 13, 2001, in Vodno, Skopje, near Ohrid–Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement²⁴

²⁰ On this, see CUKANI, *Ongoing Pristina–Belgrade Talks*, cit.

²¹ The preamble of the Constitution of Serbia, approved after the referendum held on 28 October, 2006, states that «Kosovo is an autonomous province of Serbia with significant autonomy». The full text of the preamble of the 2006 Serbian Constitution is in <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7378>.

²² See J. MCGARRY - B. O'LEARY, *Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, in S. NOEL, ed., *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, pp. 263-297. For the similarities between the decentralization in Kosovo and the federal model, see SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENT, *One Step Forward – Three Steps Back*, 15 June 2010, at http://www.vetevendosje.org/repository/docs/One_step_forward_three_steps_back.pdf.

²³ See *Preamble of the 1991 Macedonian Constitution*. Full text at <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/mk00000.html>.

²⁴ For more on the negotiations that brought to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, see M. LEBAMOFF - Z.

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(OFA) was signed which sets out a substantial agenda for constitutional and legislative reforms of the state by drawing the power sharing arrangements between the different communities and establishing the cessation of the hostilities.²⁵

According to the 2002 census, the ethnic composition of Macedonia is as follows: approximately 64.8% is composed by Macedonian Slavs that belong to the Christian religion and speak the Macedonian language; Albanians represent over 25.17% of the population: they belong mostly to the Muslim religion, speak the Albanian language and are concentrated around the boundaries with Kosovo and Albania; the remaining 10% of the population is composed by smaller ethnic groups like Turkish 3.58%, Roma 2.66%, Serb 1.78%, Vlach 0.48%, Bosniac 0.84% and other 1.04%.²⁶ According to the 2002 census, 16 municipalities of the 84 ones have Albanian majority population.

The minority issue in Macedonia and also the power sharing reforms as foreseen by the OFA, are intended, for a better accommodation of the demands and concerns of the several communities present in the Macedonian territory, but above all for the Albanian community. This seems to be obvious by the required limit of «at least 20% of the total population of the state» that is foreseen by the OFA and by the Constitution in order to gain

«official recognition of its language with specific modalities regarding its use, guaranteed equitable representation at all central and local public bodies and all levels of employment, enhanced local self-government through decentralization processes, veto powers on matters involving culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, use of symbols, laws on local finances, local elections, and boundaries of municipalities, as well as state-funded university education in their mother tongue»,²⁷

offering collective rights for all minority groups, but *de facto* the required percentage is

ILIEVSKI, *The Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia: Neither Settlement nor Resolution of Ethnic Conflict?*, International Studies Association Conference San Francisco, California, March 26-29, 2008, in http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISA_Ohridframework.pdf.

²⁵ See *Ohrid Framework Agreement, Basic provisions*, Article n. 2, *ibid*.

²⁶ The 2011 census failed as consequence of irregularities. For the final data of the 2002 census, visit the official website in <http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/knigaXIII.pdf>.

²⁷ Z. ILIEVSKI, *Conflict Resolution in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Case of Macedonia*, Master Thesis, University of Graz, 2006; also see D. TALESKI, *Minorities and Political Parties in Macedonia*, in *Political Parties and Minority Participation*, Skopje, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Office Macedonia, 2008, pp. 127-153.

possible only for the Albanians.

Some of the more important matters regulated by the OFA and receipted by the Constitution²⁸ are: Development of Decentralized Government; Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation; Special Parliamentary Procedures to be used for adopting a number of constitutional amendments and other laws affecting matters of vital interest²⁹ for the non-majority communities; Education and Use of Languages;³⁰ Expression of Identity, providing the possibility for local authorities to use (next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia) emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the municipality.³¹

According to Macedonia's Constitution, laws affecting matters of vital interest may only be passed by double majority vote in the Macedonian Assembly, namely, a majority within the Assembly as a whole that includes a majority of the votes of the Assembly members attending who «claim to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia».³² The OFA and the Constitution do not provide for “strict quotas” for representatives of the non-majority communities, as for example is established in the case of Kosovo or in the case of BiH. While the representation in the Parliament and in the Government, central and local one, is not a problem for the Albanian community,³³ the problem has been raised for the other minority groups and a legislative proposal was advanced in 2007 proposing: four

²⁸ The Constitution of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was adopted on November 17, 1991, and has been amended 31 times, most recently on April 12, 2011.

²⁹ Matters of vital interest include: the Law on Local Self-Government, the city of Skopje and boundaries of municipalities, as well as laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, use of symbols, laws on local finances and local elections.

³⁰ It is foreseen that any language spoken by at least 20% of the population is also an official language in Macedonia. Minority language is regulated in derogation of the official Macedonian language by Article 7 as amended by the V amendment.

³¹ See Article 8 of the Constitution of Macedonia. The free expression of national identity is insert into the fundamental principles of the ordainment. For a comprehensive analysis of the most important provisions of the Constitutions of the western Balkan countries, see R. TONIATTI, *Minoranze e minoranze protette*, cit., pp. 311-337.

³² Articles 69 (2) and 114 (5) of the Macedonian Constitution (as amended in 2001).

³³ It has been estimated that since 1991 to present, the political parties representing minorities have had 21 to 33 seats from the 120 total seats of the Macedonian Parliament. For more information on the Albanian political parties and on the election results consult Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2012 - Macedonia Country Report*, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, in <http://www.btiproject.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Macedoni.pdf>.

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reserved seats for the Turk community, two for the Serb community, two for the Roma community, one for the Bosniaks and one for the Vlachs.³⁴

The last local elections held on March 2013 have marked a turnaround in the internal electoral and territorial subdivisions: the Albanian party, Democratic Union for Integration (BDI), has won 12 districts on the total number of 54. For the first time after over 70 years the BDI has won the Kercove district but what stands out more is the fact that the BDI has lost the electoral competition in the Struge district, where the Albanian community represents the majority of the population. In other main urban centers,³⁵ where the majority of the population is presented by the Albanian community, the BDI was balloting.

Another crucial point of the 2013 elections is the fact that differently from the other elections, there was not a single “Albanian party” but some forms of “consociational political parties”³⁶ that helped in changing the route of the created nationalist dualism.

This demonstrates that only by increasing the political presence of other minorities in the Parliament, there will be possible to decrease the created dualism between Albanian and Macedonian parties which are increasingly becoming national parties. Furthermore, if the other minorities are presented into the Parliament by the reserved seats, the requested “double majority” needed in order to change some laws of vital interests for the communities, will not be an “exclusive” veto power exercised by the Albanian electoral parties. Scholars³⁷ have appointed that such changes of the electoral law will decrease tensions between Macedonian and Albanian parties, but will increase tensions between Albanians and other non-majority communities.

As a further element of integration by power sharing arrangements, the Constitution establishes a Parliamentary Committee for Inter-Community Relations,³⁸ comprised of

³⁴ See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF MACEDONIA, *Proposal for Changes and Amendments to the Election Law*, June 2007.

³⁵ Tetova, Tearca, Gostivari, Struga, Haracina, Dollnen Vracishti, Studenican. For more information on the elections in Macedonia consult the OSCE official page at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/99772>.

³⁶ The examples may be given by the PDSH (the Serbian minority party with an Albanian candidate in the above mentioned districts) and LSDM parties. Also the Roma and the Turkish minority parties have won the elections in some districts.

³⁷ See TALESKI, *Minorities and Political Parties in Macedonia*, cit., p. 127-153.

³⁸ See Article 78 of the Macedonian Constitution.

seven representatives of ethnic Macedonians, seven representatives of ethnic Albanians, and five representatives of the smaller ethnic minorities.

The experience of Macedonia shows that increasing the political participation of the other minority groups remains the only possibility for the consociational democratic form to work, otherwise, the risk is that the power sharing arrangements will degenerate in a dualistic model.

4. Conclusions

Consociational power sharing arrangements were imposed in a first phase by the international actors like a necessary tool for reaching peace in both countries taken in consideration: Kosovo and Macedonia. Although this first intent was “strictly” imposed by the international community, achieving democracy through power sharing settlements still remains a prerogative.

The above overview of the different mechanisms foreseen by the relative International Agreements, and subsequently by the constitutional arrangements, put in evidence the variety of the adopted mechanisms that aim to make the political system workable and democratic. What has been put in evidence is the fact that if in the first phase the power sharing arrangements suffers from the “main non dominant minority” kin state role, by assuming a dualistic role form, the only possibility for the host state stands on its capability to increase the representation of the other non-dominant groups. Thus, representation becomes a principal tool for participation into the state institutions.

In deeply divided societies, like the ones taken in consideration, political representation of all several groups as a principal characteristic of consociational power sharing, have more possibilities to be achieved if foreseen by the Constitution. This seems to be crucial in the first phase, where the game played between central state and political elites of the main non majority community, can degenerate from a consociational to a dualistic system, like in the Macedonian case. At last, the European Union integration perspective of both host and kin state, remains a principal tool for a democratic accommodation of the minority claims and for reaching stability in the region.