




European
Commission

VALUES AND IDENTITIES

A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE



Values and Identities – a policymaker’s guide

Abstract: This report presents the state-of-the-art scientific knowledge on values and identities from an interdisciplinary perspective. Values are said to be the dominating forces in life and identities represent who we are and to whom we belong. Both shape the political landscape in democracies and have gained in importance in recent decades. The report contains important insights for policymakers to adapt their work to the challenges of our time, including a dedicated toolbox section. The scientific review and toolbox are complemented by findings from a dedicated Eurobarometer on values and identities commissioned for this purpose.

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VALUES AND IDENTITIES

A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE



FOREWORD



MAROŠ ŠEFČOVIČ
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
VICE-PRESIDENT FOR
INTERINSTITUTIONAL
RELATIONS AND FORESIGHT

As Vice-President responsible for Inter-institutional Relations and Foresight, I welcome this report by the Joint Research Centre, as it shines a new light on how policymakers can strategically design future-proof policies that address citizens' concerns.

To do so, the European Commission needs to pay close attention to the values and identities citizens want to live by. This was recognised in the 2021 Commission Communication on Better regulation, which stated that 'to sustain trust in the European Union, EU policies need to take into account and reflect the values and concerns of citizens'. The report can help us to achieve this goal in two ways.

First, in foresight, values are considered as core drivers of change. Understanding different values and identities thus allows policymakers to imagine different desired versions of the future. In turn, EU policies informed by strategic foresight can be more resilient, meaningful and inclusive of different perspectives. This can lead to long-term benefits for citizens.

Second, understanding diverse values and multiple identities can also help policymakers make better laws, including via deeper insights into the policy issues at stake and into the best solutions to address them. Compromises, arbitration and trade-offs between interests and values is necessary and should be based on the best available evidence. As such, better law-making requires a thorough analysis of its impact on different interests, values and identities.

To assist the European Commission in this task, the Joint Research Centre has summed up the complex science on values and identities. This report represents a first critical step in creating new tools to help policymakers explore different views of stakeholders, and citizens at large, and to better integrate their values and identities into policymaking and deliver future-proof policies.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Maroš Šefčovič'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial 'M' and 'S'.

Maroš Šefčovič
Vice-President for Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight

FOREWORD



VĚRA JOUROVÁ
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
VICE-PRESIDENT
FOR VALUES AND
TRANSPARENCY

Countries all around the world face tremendous challenges; climate change, a loss of biodiversity threatening food security, the fallout from COVID-19, increasing inequality and decreasing social mobility. Democracies are uniquely suited to resolve such challenges in a fair and legitimate way, taking into account different values, interests and perspectives. However, recent years have seen a decrease in understanding and willingness to compromise, high levels of polarisation and a historic low in satisfaction with democracy. The growth of identity politics and powerful populist movements has seen not only specific policies come under attack but often the legitimacy of the democratic process itself.

Reinforcing trust in democratic solutions requires more than fighting fake news or teaching science and critical thinking in schools. We also need to understand the diversity of personal values of citizens and their identities.

The European Union has a number of instruments that underpin our democracies in the EU treaties. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union lays out the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of minorities.

Some have questioned whether these EU values are widely shared by EU citizens. The results from a new Eurobarometer – explored in this comprehensive report – show an overwhelming support for our shared values, in particular the Rule of Law as well as for LGBTIQ rights. This underpins that politicians seeking to undermine these fundamental values do not have the prevailing support of citizens across the EU or even within their own Member State.

But if we are to promote EU values, we need to understand the full spectrum of values held by EU citizens and how they relate to the EU values. This report is a warning of a clear and present danger to democracy. If we do not take care to renew trust in our democracies to represent and take into account the full spectrum of different values, then we risk further polarisation and dangers of identity politics, including an epistemic as well as a democratic crisis.

As the European Commission's Vice-President for Values and Transparency, I am most grateful to my colleague Commissioner Gabriel for enabling the Joint Research Centre to produce this state-of-the-art report that provides the scientific underpinning for the work of the Commission. Importantly, in addition to synthesising the latest science, the report provides an innovative way forward to understand and integrate the plurality of values in Europe in our policymaking.

Democracy and the values it is built on should never be taken for granted, which is why the European Commission wants to build on this work, to strengthen political accountability, enhance public interest and create a new sense of civic engagement in Europe.



Věra Jourová

Vice-President for Values and Transparency

FOREWORD



MARIYA GABRIEL
EUROPEAN
COMMISSIONER FOR
INNOVATION, RESEARCH,
CULTURE, EDUCATION
AND YOUTH

Evidence-informed policies help us understand that science is not values-free. The choice of a research topic is subjective. A debate about scientific facts sometimes a trigger for a much-needed reflection about underlying values.

The dialogues that characterise science can sometimes entrench views and lead to polarisation ('My Facts' vs. 'Your Facts'). Reaching a consensus on scientific facts brings objectivity to the forefront and can benefit from including values in the debate. It enriches, not undermines the important role of science.

It is important to balance the views on the COVID-19 pandemic through the scientific perspective and, at the same time, to include the human-centric aspect of the impact on saving countless lives.

With this in mind, I recall the importance to consider Citizens' values and identities, attitudes and behaviours in the broader scientific understanding of things. Knowing and addressing citizens' concerns can transform evidence into evidence-informed policies.

Europe faces the challenge of transformational changes to our environment, our economy and our society in the coming decades. These changes require broad support from all parts of society. We will not persuade EU citizens to support these changes unless we tackle their goals, wishes and concerns.

This report provides a robust scientific approach about how to link scientific evidence and enquiry with the need to understand citizens' values and identities.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Mariya Gabriel', with a horizontal line underneath it.

Mariya Gabriel
Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report, intended for policy and decision-makers, is the first of its kind to bring together interdisciplinary insights from the social and behavioural sciences on values and identities in the political process. Co-created with academia and policymakers, it has benefited from formal and informal input from scientific experts and policy practitioners, as well as representatives from international and civil society organisations. The state-of-the-art scientific review is complemented by findings from a dedicated Eurobarometer on values and identities commissioned for this purpose.¹

■ Why values and identities are important to policymaking and politics

Challenges for successful policymaking

Policymaking in democracies seeks to change behaviour for the greater good of society. What citizens desire is strongly influenced by what they perceive to be valuable. Valuable in this sense cannot be solely determined in monetary terms. Understanding what the greater good means requires not only an understanding of the facts and what is possible but also what is desired by citizens. There are political and financial consequences for policymaking if the values shaping policies fail to correspond with citizens' values.

'The most difficult political choices are not between good and bad but between good and good.'² Consequently, policymakers need to be transparent in their decision-making process to uphold trust in

government, while recognising that it is an almost impossible task for policymakers to respect all citizens' values equally.

Values-related issues are magnified when coupled with group identities, where winning or the domination of a group can be more important than living up to one's own values.

The growing importance of values and identities in politics and in citizens' lives

For most of the 20th Century, politics in Europe were viewed through the lens of the left-right divide relating to socio-economic interests. Today, individual values, attitudes and identities predict political behaviour better than traditional class affiliations. Increased material wealth, security and widespread education since WWII have led to a rise of 'post-materialist values' such as self-expression and self-actualisation.

In the new 'cultural' political conflict, group delineations based on ethnicity, norms, religions and values are increasingly demarcating identity in addition to socio-economic class. For modern democracies, the two main political conflict lines, on the economic dimension and the new powerful cultural dimension, now coexist.

The European project was developed at a time when the socio-economic class cleavage was predominant. Consequently, the EU institutions are well organised to address such issues, e.g. through

¹ Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi:10.2760/206143

² Galston (1999, p.771) - see References No.12

economic impact assessments. However, as the cultural values cleavage emerges, the EU needs to acquire new tools to understand the new fault line.

This was recognised in the 2021 Communication on *Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws*, that emphasised ‘to sustain trust in the European Union, EU policies need to take into account and reflect the values and concerns of citizens’.

Challenges for policymaking with convictions

On the issues people care about the most, their own values and views from their social groups automatically colour their views and beliefs in the facts themselves. It is very difficult to reach consensus on evidence for the most contested and consequently the most important policy issues. It is easy to find illogical arguments in others, but not necessarily in oneself. There is an urgent need to understand and recognise that others may simply have different value priorities that can legitimately lead both sides to conclude something different from the same evidence.

The myside bias, the tendency to favour information that confirms one’s preconceptions and convictions, presents a particular trap for the elites as it is not mitigated by intelligence, political sophistication or the tendency to display actively open-minded thinking; it is a central challenge to evidence-informed policymaking.

As a result, negotiating policy between policymakers, experts and politicians may well involve more value judgements than for ordinary citizens, even if more evidence is used at the same time.

■ Understanding the values and social identities of EU citizens

Unity in diversity?

Values are a blend of biological and evolutionary factors coupled with individual and societal histories.

Values are highly stable at the individual level and are mostly shaped by life conditions during childhood, adolescence and early adulthood

through the influence of parents, neighbours, friends and schools. They are also potentially heritable. When values shift at a societal level, the shift is therefore slow and driven by cohort or generational changes.

Personal values describe the consistent priority people have for one’s value direction over another based upon underlying stable, core motivations. The personal values concept of Basic Human Values developed by Schwartz – that forms the cornerstone for this report – has been validated in over 200 samples in 80 countries around the world. Personal values are stable, generally seen as positive but sometimes have an oppositional relationship to each other; these relationships are universal across societies. The relative importance of a value matters when forming attitudes or guiding behaviour, especially when a policy or action is related to conflicting values.

The predominant values in a group or society as a whole become important in their own right because they have a normative social influence on the individual citizen. Group values are particularly relevant for publicly visible conformity behaviour and can override personal values preferences because citizens want to belong, identify with a group and fear being ostracised or punished.

From values to policy preferences, political orientation and affiliation

Due to their abstract nature, values still need to be contextualised. In many cases, there is a broad, common understanding of a value, but the connection can vary through an individual’s personal expectations and experience with media and culture. Political elites also wield considerable power over political framing to drive or magnify political conflicts over values and identities.

Clearly connecting values to behaviours and attitudes in policymaking has the potential to increase policy effectiveness in changing behaviour, while noting that different values may motivate the same behaviours.

There is an established link between personal values over citizens' political attitudes to explaining voting behaviour. Importantly, when parties change their positions, citizens partially also change their political attitudes while their personal values stay the same. Consequently, 'values are the "glue" of the political translation process that binds together citizens' political attachments'¹¹¹.

EU values and their relation to personal values

The EU values, enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaties, are important guiding principles for many policymakers in the EU. The meanings of the EU values resemble some of the psychological foundations of personal values, but do not represent the full spectrum of values diversity. According to the latest Eurobarometer data, the vast majority of EU citizens strongly supports EU values as laid out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. There is no fundamental difference between EU countries when it comes to agreeing with the EU values.

The EU value most highly supported by EU citizens is the independence of courts and the right to a fair trial, followed by the independence of judges. The right to asylum and the rejection of the death penalty are supported by smaller majorities of EU citizens.

Social identities as magnifiers of values and political conflict

Social identities as the foundation of modern 'tribes'

There are two important components of identity: personal and the social identity. Personal identity is based on a person's values, experiences and knowledge, and is mostly perceived to be unique. The relevance of personal identity for policymaking comes from the argument that values are at its core, therefore, when one's values are threatened, it is also true that the sense of self is threatened.

Social identification can shift a person's behaviour to align with the group by ascribing characteristics, values and qualities of the group to the self and

depersonalising one's personal identity. Identification of oneself and others into various social groups is human nature. Belonging to a group is a source of self-esteem and distinctiveness. The identification with a group can be an advantage for working together but can also be to the exclusion of others, as seen in many political conflicts of our time. The identification with one group often leads to a reduced willingness to interact and share with others and to perceive others as less positive.

One way to harness the positive effect of social identities without the negative by-product of out-group biases, is through highlighting a common identity or probably more successfully, dual identities.

Relationship between values and identities

How much and with whom citizens identify reflects their values. People also identify with groups when they share goals and values with other members. Shared values and goals are fundamental for people to sustain their belonging to a group, particularly for political parties.

As values are an integral part of group identities, if citizens see themselves excluded or antagonised by society as a whole, they can also try to identify themselves with groups that reject the prevailing values of society. When conflicts are based on social identities, the goal is to win, even if it costs one or both sides. When the conflict centres on values, the goal is about how to satisfy the needs and motivations behind values and compromise is more likely.

■ Identity politics, polarisation and values diversity

Social identities in politics

Each society has multiple culture-specific and cross-cultural groups and identities which citizens find important. Local (e.g. nationality), sectoral (e.g. health ministry), organisational (e.g. political party), demographic/biographic (e.g. gender) and informal identities (e.g. around specific events) are important

¹¹¹ Lupton et al. (2020, p.242) - see References No.163

categories to help map social identities in the political decision-making process. People have multiple identities but only a few of them are relevant to an individual at any one time. This relevance depends on the social status of the group, the similarity with other group members and the situation, e.g. where politicians and the media can make certain groups more relevant to a policy issue.

The prominence of partisan identity

Of all the social identities, partisanship is particularly relevant to the political decision-making process as it has the capacity to subsume other social identities, such as left-right, national, European and populist identities. Partisans are the most involved in politics and are therefore important for democratic citizen involvement in politics in general. Identity politics can involve many different identities because every characteristic can become the source of an identity and therefore of in-group cohesion and out-group bias.

Social identities are relevant to the self-concept and self-esteem of citizens. People protect their identity when threatened. There are many ways in which these identities can be threatened, resulting in increased tribalism and out-group discrimination. It is therefore highly relevant for policymakers to take identities into account in their decision-making processes. It is also important to note those identities considered particularly significant to European citizens, for example by avoiding actions that could be perceived as threatening towards them.

According to the Eurobarometer results, Family is the most important identity, followed by Nationality, while European identity, Religion and Political orientation seem to be relatively less important.

Diversity in values and identities and the link to polarisation

How diverse are values within EU societies?

Values diversity will always exist and is usually stronger within a country than between countries.

This finding is generally corroborated by the Eurobarometer data.

The Eurobarometer shows that people who identify strongly with their political orientation polarise more strongly on values consistent with their political orientation on the political left-right spectrum. It therefore follows that the people most likely to be active in politics are the ones who most differ in their orientations of values, while those who are less political are rather similar.

In contrast to seeking a broader values base for developing policies, in a direct conflict situation, values should not be raised if a solution is sought. Focusing on interests has been shown to decrease people's feelings of self-involvement and increase perceptions of common ground. Tackling interests can indirectly address values from different perspectives.

Evidence on polarisation in Europe

Political polarisation represents an extreme form of disagreement. There are two types of polarisation: Issue polarisation and Affective polarisation. Issue polarisation refers to differences in policy preferences and attitudes to concrete policy decisions – the substance of policy and political decisions. Affective polarisation captures how much people dislike other groups in the political context and how distant they feel from them in terms of commonality and liking.

The interrelations between both types of polarisation do not show a clear, predictable pattern, which means that strong issue polarisation does not require strong Affective polarisation and vice versa.

In Europe, from the limited data available, issue polarisation seems to be in decline or remain stable. In contrast, levels of Affective polarisation in Europe are similar to those in the USA. The landscape varies within Europe where southern and central-eastern Europe are highly affectively polarised when it comes to politics, reaching similar or higher levels than the USA.

If citizens disagree on issues derived from values, policymakers can take these into account when designing policies, because they legitimately reflect peoples' preferences, wishes and needs. When addressing Affective polarisation by contrast, policymakers need to develop policies and behaviours that reduce dislike, misperceptions and safeguard democratic institutions.

There is evidence that political identities are becoming more important in peoples' everyday life. The evidence from the Eurobarometer indicates that political orientation is already slightly more important than religious beliefs in the EU, yet not as important as several other identities.

■ Policymaking fit for the 21st Century

Policymaking under diversity

Policymakers have to constantly work with values diversity. If values are in opposition in a specific policy, successful resolution may not only focus on the outcome, but also on the way it was achieved.

Integrating values and identities into policymaking

As an overarching approach, a 'Various Values View' looks at a specific policy problem through different values lenses in support of policymaking.

The Toolbox

Three tool types (see boxes to the right) proposed to assist policymakers in considering values and identities in policymaking:

- i) Heightened understanding;
- ii) Co-creation; and
- iii) Communication.

Future outlook and research agenda

Today, many people and especially the young are facing economic and psychological hardship, meaning that changes in priority given to certain values over the last decades may reverse. The question of value change also highlights the urgent need to know more about polarisation in countries outside of the USA and in the EU in particular.



TOOL TYPE 1 – HEIGHTENED UNDERSTANDING

- Discover one's own values priorities and values blind spots using a survey
- Use a Fast-track Values Assessment to identify whether a policy is highly value-laden
- Use a Fast-track Identities Assessment to identify whether a policy is highly identity-laden
- Include questions on values in citizen polling (e.g. Eurobarometer) to uncover underlying psychological drivers of opinions and attitudes



TOOL TYPE 2. - CO-CREATION

- Use Citizen Engagement and Deliberative Democracy processes to understand values diversity, issue frames diversity and to break down identity barriers
- Use a Values4Policy workshop to learn about and discover how policy problems and proposed solutions can be perceived through different values lenses
- Use Strategic Foresight incorporating a values explainer and values detector to uncover diverse values-driven scenarios



TOOL TYPE 3. - COMMUNICATION

- Communicate using values frames for effective communication, while keeping in mind potential ethical implications
- Use a values text-mining and media-monitoring tool to learn about one's own values regarding communication habits and about the way citizens express their values around policy topics

For democracies to find ways to deal with multiple political cleavages efficiently and in a trustworthy way will be a major challenge. It is also not unthinkable that further cleavages may emerge in the future.

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) will also continue its work in this field. The next project under the multiannual research programme Enlightenment 2.0 is 'Meaningful and ethical communications' across the political decision-making process.



XR (Extinction Rebellion) activists demonstrating and calling out the World Health Organization (WHO) to take action against climate change. Geneva, Switzerland, May 29, 2021.

INTRODUCTION

‘Values are baked into everything. This implies that one can neither act, govern, manage and administer, nor innovate, design and intervene without them. No narrative evolves, no decisions are taken, no advice is given, no technologies are developed without values shaping them, whether consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly.’


European Group on Ethics, 2021.^{IV}

This report, intended for policy and decision-makers, is the first of its kind to bring together insights from several social and behavioural science disciplines on the subject. It makes the important link between values and identities, and demonstrates the role they play in citizens’ political behaviour: i.e. what citizens want public policy to achieve, how they decide who to vote for, if at all, what to campaign for or against, as well as how policymakers ought to respond.

Current political discourse makes frequent appeals to values and identities. However, there is a lack of consensus about what is meant by these terms and, importantly, the extent of their influence on political behaviour. Although the scientific debate on these topics continues, the rich scholarship from several disciplines yields pertinent insights for policymakers.

For the purpose of this report, values are defined as **abstract goals or motivations that are important in many situations**, such as Freedom, Tolerance or Security. **Social identities are the groups a person feels he/she belongs to**, for example based on nationality, party or occupation. The following chapters place these definitions in context to provide policymakers with the means to better understand and take into account citizens’ values and identities.

The report has five chapters:



Finally, this report synthesises many hundreds of scientific articles from different scientific disciplines. To ensure a shared understanding of common terms, the reader is invited to consult the Glossary provided at the end of the report.

^{IV} https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/new-ege-statement-ethics-and-governance-shows-how-values-and-democracy-are-necessary-responsible-future-making-2021-jun-09-0_en?s=03

METHODOLOGY

“ This report does not seek to make judgements on the comparative merits of different values – this is up to citizens and their elected representatives. Instead this report states that citizens typically have not come to their values solely through reasoning.”

The breadth of expertise required to bring significant scientific insights to policymakers on values and identities meant that collaboration was central to the methodology behind this report. An international Call for Expertise was launched in August 2019 seeking experts in the fields of values and identities. Applications from many disciplines were encouraged.

An evaluation committee reviewed the applications based upon published criteria^v. Twenty-nine scientific experts were selected from the fields of: Economics; Ethnology/Anthropology; Legal Studies; Political Science; Psychology; Philosophy; Social Psychology; Sociology and Theology.

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) organised an initial workshop in October 2020 to establish consensus on the approach, methodology and research questions that the experts would answer. Policymaking colleagues from across the Commission were involved in these discussions. After the workshop, scientific experts jointly answered a comprehensive set of research questions identified in the initial workshop and provided state-of-the-science reviews. Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, a second workshop for collective sense-making was replaced with a series of online workshops.

An important part of the report results from a Special Eurobarometer on values and identities, which was commissioned by the JRC for this report (wave 94.1). Using a randomised, representative sample, in excess of 27 000 EU citizens expressed their opinions. The survey was developed in collaboration with the experts to capture the values and identities most relevant in EU politics. The launch of the survey was delayed due to COVID-19, resulting in the fieldwork taking place between October 2020 and January 2021. Importantly, this means that the survey was conducted at a time when the coronavirus pandemic was prevalent across all Member States, with continuing impacts on health, the economy and restrictions on multiple aspects of everyday life of European citizens. The full results to all questions can be found in a separate report available on the website of the JRC.

In parallel, the JRC continued to work with an inter-service group within the Commission to feed in the views from policymaking practitioners to ensure the science remained relevant for them.

^v <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/enlightenment/call-experts-science-of-values>

Thank you

This report is a collaborative work of synthesis, co-created with academia and policymakers. It has received formal and informal input from individual experts and policy practitioners,

as well as representatives from international and civil society organisations. We are indebted to everyone who has generously contributed to this work; thank you, this report would not have been possible without you. The full list of external experts can be found at the end of this report.

NORMATIVE STATEMENT

Policymaking is a complex process that includes both an analytical and a normative dimension, both of which are essential to good policymaking. In other words, science can inform policymaking, by accurately describing the situation, providing options and analysing consequences, but ultimately policy choices are also about values.

The *analytical* process is essential to properly identify the state of the world and the expected developments, as well as the costs and benefits of different policy options.

The *normative* process is vital to make the necessary trade-offs between the different values and interests at stake in society. Often the normative debate confounds, consciously or sub-consciously, the analytical one because problems are framed and evidence is provided to support legitimate yet partial interests or values.

The authors do not subscribe to the view that science is ‘value-free’, i.e. that it is completely disinterested, impartial, objective, rational and morally neutral. The scientific method and scientific institutions are, however, a powerful system to overcome biases in the search for truth and to build trust. However, they are not infallible. Moreover, it is not always possible to neatly separate normative from analytical considerations. Furthermore, values are central to the framing of policy problems and the selection of supporting evidence. Research thus includes normative as well as analytic aspects.

This is even more the case when the research topic itself is values and identities.

Several approaches to thinking and measuring values and identities are reviewed in this report. The underlying models that describe the values of citizens treat them on an equal footing. This does not, however, imply any endorsement for value relativism, giving all values an equal normative validity. This report does not seek to make judgements on the comparative merits of different values – this is up to citizens and their elected representatives. Instead this report states that citizens typically have not come to their values solely through reasoning. Rather, a complex interaction between education systems, learning, early life experiences in the family as well as social circles all play their part. Values are stable and difficult to change. This means that in order to better understand EU citizens, there is a need to develop an understanding of all values, in addition to those in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.

Finally, this report is based upon a state-of-the-science review of the relevant scientific literature. Where normative judgements were required, the authors relied upon the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.



March on Capitol Hill. Washington D.C., USA, January 6, 2021.

WHY VALUES AND IDENTITIES ARE IMPORTANT TO POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS

■ 1.1. Challenges for successful policymaking

Policymaking in democracies seeks to change behaviour for the greater good of society. To do this, an understanding of what the greater good means requires not only an understanding of the facts and what is possible but also what citizens desire.

Scientific evidence is rarely prescriptive about what to do^{1,2}, and is not intended to determine the single best policy option. For democratically-elected politicians, citizen support for policy initiatives is essential³. Citizens will feel less inclined to comply with and support policies if the values shaping them do not correspond with their own. This can result in slower adoption and higher costs of monitoring and enforcement to achieve satisfactory compliance and the desired impact.

Consequently, policymaking ideally requires:

- i. evidence about the current situation;
- ii. knowledge about how citizens perceive problems and what they want;

The most difficult political choices are not between good and bad but between good and good.

Galston (1999, p.771)

- iii. the resources, mandate and ability to design policies;
- iv. an understanding of what options are available, including their likely impacts; and
- v. an understanding of how to reach citizens in a way that secures their support for these policies.

In short, policymakers need to combine the best available science and a fundamental understanding of citizens' underlying wishes, values, needs and identities.


What citizens want follows what they perceive to be valuable. Valuable in this sense cannot be solely determined in monetary terms. Values reflect a complex, culture-infused process establishing what citizens want and what they think is best for themselves and for society^{4,5}. Some values may even be considered priceless, sacred or protected^{6,7}. In this report, values are defined as abstract goals or motivations that are important in more than one specific situation, such as Freedom, Equality, Self-expression, and Tradition^{8,9}.

Policymaking usually requires trade-offs between these competing values. When citizens make decisions in their daily lives, they often decide between competing values by using cognitive short-cuts (heuristics), among which includes what their peers consider to be the 'right' solution¹⁰. In contrast, policymakers working in democracies cannot rely on such a strategy. Instead, to uphold legislative accountability and consequently institutional trust, they need to ensure transparency throughout the decision-making process, which should include an explanation of trade-offs. There are political and financial consequences for policymaking if the values shaping policies fail to correspond with citizens' values¹¹. This challenge is further complicated by the different hierarchies of values humans possess and the almost impossible task

of being able to measure them⁶. As Galston (1999, p.771) puts it, 'The most difficult political choices are not between good and bad but between good and good.'¹²

The science behind values has identified some that are universally understood the same way around the world – this is explained in Chapter 2. Importantly, values are generally stable on the individual level, especially in adulthood¹³⁻¹⁶. The prioritisation of values is diverse between citizens and more so within than between countries¹⁷. Although most values are regarded positively by everyone, people differ in the intensity with which they are guided by some values over others⁸. For example, many people would agree with the importance of both equality and freedom, but the relative importance between them determines opposition to, or agreement with, regulations, taxation or policies that may promote or dissuade the expression of those values.

It is therefore a potentially impossible task for a policy to respect all citizens' values equally due to their complicated nature, diversity and potential conflicts. This problem is magnified when different values are bundled together with group identities, where winning or domination on behalf of a group can be more important than living up to one's values.



Berlin's Olympic Stadium illuminated with the rainbow colours during Euro 2020 football game between Germany and Hungary played in Munich. Berlin, Germany, June 2021

KEY FINDINGS

- Policymaking in democracies seeks to change behaviour for the greater good of society. An understanding of what greater good means requires not only an understanding of the facts and what is possible but also what is desired.
- What citizens desire is what they perceive to be valuable. Valuable in this sense cannot be solely determined in monetary terms.
- There are political and financial consequences for policymaking if the values shaping policies fail to correspond with citizens' values.
- The most difficult political choices are not between good and bad but between good and good.
- Policymakers need to be transparent in their decision-making process to uphold institutional trust.
- Some values are universally understood globally. Values are generally stable at the individual level, especially in adulthood.
- The prioritisation of values is diverse between citizens and more so within than between countries.
- It is a potentially impossible task for a policy to respect all citizens' values equally.
- Values-related issues are magnified when coupled with group identities, where winning or the domination of a group can be more important than living up to one's own values.


■ 1.2. The growing importance of values and identities in politics and in citizens' lives

When talking about values in established democracies today, discussions often revolve around topics such as gender equality, LGBTIQ rights, religious freedoms, immigration rights and general tolerance, but also increasingly respect, belonging and environmental protection. Many of these issues have been restricted in the past¹⁸. Changes in these areas are seen as progress by some but are opposed by others. Importantly, the landscape of views towards these topics seems to be shifting over time^{16,19,20}.

For most of the 20th Century, policies and politics in Europe (and the USA) have been viewed primarily through the lens of the left-right divide related to socio-economic interests. This divide defined the major political fault lines and policy choices²¹⁻²³. Today, by contrast, individual values, attitudes and identities predict political behaviour better than traditional class affiliations²⁴⁻²⁶. People today are more prone to 'express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and finding meaning in their own uniqueness'²⁷.

One important strand of research explains this through the 'modernisation process', namely that increased material wealth, security and widespread education since WWII – especially in the Western hemisphere – has led to 'post-materialist values' such as self-expression and self-actualisation²⁸.

This change in the orientation of large sections of populations has reduced the influence of norms and traditions, and allows – but also forces – people to become more autonomous and individualistic¹⁹. This slow change has happened mostly over a generational replacement rather than a change on the individual level¹⁶. Nevertheless, each country still has its own historical and cultural uniqueness, with roots in ecological and historical conditions and threats that should not be overlooked²⁹⁻³².

Figure 1: Cultural and economic issue salience in political manifestos in 21 western democracies.

Source: Hall (2020).³³

The increased importance of values in their own right is accompanied by a shift in the main political conflict in most post-industrial societies.^{vi} While economic class struggles persist, recent decades have seen the rise of a new divide linked to ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ values. These are typically centred around traditions and traditional morality, minority rights, multiculturalism and the environment^{28,34,35}. In the new dominating political conflict, group delineations based on ethnicity, norms, religions, behaviours and values are increasingly demarcating identity in addition to socio-economic class^{35–40}.

For modern democracies, the two main political conflict lines of the economic dimension and the new powerful cultural dimension are coexisting.

Contrary to popular opinion, this is not a recent development, although the 2016 US election and the UK’s Brexit referendum have made this more salient. An analysis of the political landscape in six western European countries^{vii} between the 1970s and 1990s identified a shift where ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ policies had become the most salient issues already in the 1990s in western Europe (with the exception of Germany).^{viii} Figure 1 shows that cultural issues have become increasingly important since 1950 in 21 western democracies, measured by analysing political party manifestos³³.

The changing salience in conflicts between values coincides with a change in the major proponents of each side of the conflict. In the past, citizens


^{vi} Some authors argue that it is only the shift that makes values more relevant in society (Norris and Inglehart 2018).

^{vii} Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

^{viii} More specifically, the traditional parties (social democrats, conservatives, liberals) became more culturally and socially open, as well as the addition of green parties and a simultaneous emergence of a new far right at the far end of the restrictive social policy spectrum (whilst also being economically open). The findings by Gethin et al. (2021) goes further in showing that individuals with higher incomes still vote right-wing leading to ‘multiple elite party systems’, in which the educated elite opposes the income elite politically.

belonging to the same socio-economic class fought for the goals of their class, depending on their relative societal standing. Today, highly educated people in particular, seem to have shifted their position. To illustrate, Figure 2 shows the transition of support for left-wing parties in several western democracies over time.

Figure 2: Difference in left-wing parties' vote share (top 10 % and bottom 90 %). Selected western democracies, % points.



Source: Gethin et al. (2021)⁴².

In the post-war period, left-wing parties received most votes from lower educated, working-class citizens. This trend has reversed over time in most countries. Today, left-wing parties are mostly voted for by more highly educated citizens⁴¹⁻⁴³. This change in voting patterns reflects the increased importance of values, as education influences views towards culture, individual freedoms and equality^{44,45}. One could argue that the overall increase in educational standards plays a significant role; however this trend is not mirrored by a similar shift around income. High-income earners, when controlling for education, continue to support right-wing parties⁴².

Finally, the shift in values has been accompanied in many countries by the rise of polarisation, Identity politics and populism, questioning the conventional political establishment and sometimes the entire concept of the EU^{40,46,47}. This can partially be explained by increased economic hardship linked to import competition from other countries, job automation, and rural and manufacturing decline. However, these 'hard factors' are generally perceived as being too narrow to solely explain the rise of (right-wing) populism and identity politics^{40,48}. Ultimately, a 'cultural backlash' against rapid cultural transformations based on citizens' core values seems to be reinforced by growing economic insecurities^{35,39,40,49}.

Although significant, these findings should be treated with caution. Political elites wield considerable power over political framing to drive or magnify political conflicts, such that the change is probably a combination of both underlying societal drivers and elite framing⁵⁰⁻⁵².

“ The shift in values has been accompanied in many countries by the rise of polarisation, Identity politics and populism, questioning the conventional political establishment and sometimes the entire concept of the EU.”

KEY FINDINGS

- In established democracies, contemporary discussions on values centre on topics that have historically been restricted.
- For most of the 20th Century, politics in Europe have been viewed through the lens of the left-right divide relating to socio-economic interests.
- Today, individual values, attitudes and identities predict political behaviour better than traditional class affiliations.
- Increased material wealth, security and widespread education since WWII has led to 'post-materialist values' such as self-expression and self-actualisation.
- Today, greater numbers of the highly educated vote for left-wing parties.
- In the new political conflict, group delineations based on ethnicity, norms, religions and values are increasingly demarcating identity in addition to socio-economic class.
- The two main political conflict lines of the economic dimension and the new powerful cultural dimension are coexisting in modern democracies.
- A 'cultural backlash' against rapid cultural transformations based on citizens' core values is being reinforced by growing economic insecurities.

1.3. Challenges for policymaking with conviction

Citizens' values have become more important in demarcating the political conflicts of the age, but this demarcation is not limited to the political arena. Best practice suggests that evidence-informed policymaking can help ensure that policies are robust, regardless of political disagreements. Nevertheless, this idealised approach of first seeking agreement on the facts before debating the policy options seems to be difficult when it comes to convictions. Evidence shows that on the issues people care about the most, their own values and views from their social groups automatically colour their own views and beliefs in the facts themselves. In other words, it is very difficult to reach consensus on evidence, independently of convictions, for the most contested and, consequently the most important, policy issues.

Table 1: List of motivations for updating beliefs.

Different motivations identified for updating beliefs:	
Belonging goals	System goals
Epistemic goals	Moral goals
Existential goals	Accuracy goals
Status goals	

Source: Van Bavel and Pereira (2018).⁵³


The idea that the provision of more or better evidence automatically leads people to adapt their beliefs, often referred to as the 'deficit model', has been shown to be unrealistic⁵⁴. There are many conflicting motivations for people to ignore or incorporate new information into their beliefs^{53,55-57}. Indeed, humankind's reasoning capability seems to have evolved more as a social function to convince others and less for seeking the truth^{58,59}. As a result, it is easier to spot illogical

arguments in others than in oneself. Besides the desire for accuracy of knowledge, the willingness to incorporate new information is influenced by the need to belong to a group, to be seen as a good or moral person or having a certain status within one's own social group, see Table 1⁵³.

“It is very difficult to reach consensus on evidence, independently of convictions, for the most contested and, consequently the most important, policy issues.”

If new information contradicts what someone wishes to be true, hard work is often invested to find fault with the information, finding reasons to downgrade the reliability of the source or searching for other evidence to support the initial beliefs^{60,61}. This tendency to favour information that confirms our preconceptions and convictions, sometimes called ‘myside bias’, is a central challenge to evidence-informed policymaking.

Figure 3: Stylized extent of myside bias depending on attitude strength.



It is easy to assume that only others fall prey to myside bias. Unfortunately, myside bias presents a particular trap for elites, because while, for example, higher levels of intelligence reduce many biases; intelligence, cognitive ability, political sophistication and the tendency for actively open-minded thinking do not seem to help against myside bias⁶²⁻⁶⁴. What's more, on highly political topics such as gun control in the USA, people with high numeracy skills were found to be even more likely to interpret evidence in a self-serving way, confirming prior beliefs on both sides of the political divide (for and against gun control)⁶². This finding has been replicated for other topics such as immigration, health care, same-sex marriage, carbon emissions and nuclear power⁶⁵.

There is still a debate on whether the effect is asymmetrical in reality – whether people on the right and left are equally prone to this



tendency^{66–69}. However, it is clear that all sides *can* and *do* fall for the myside bias. In other words, what we and the groups we belong to value and what we perceive to be true are difficult to separate from each other, especially for those very interested in politics, such as policymakers and the readers of this report.

Myside bias and the inability to notice it in oneself becomes problematic and even more relevant in cases where there are many different opinions and pieces of information. In today's digital world, policymakers and citizens alike can easily find evidence to apparently confirm their views.

Additionally, people tend to exaggerate the influence of personality on the behaviour of others without taking into account the contextual circumstances and social pressures that lead to that behaviour. This tendency is called the fundamental attribution error⁷⁰. In disagreements, myside bias and the fundamental attribution error can together result in the evaluation of others as either stupid, evil or both, thus increasing polarisation⁷¹.

There is therefore an urgent need to understand and recognise that others may simply have different value priorities, which can legitimately lead both sides to conclude something different from the same evidence. For example, while mis- and disinformation are certainly harmful to democratic debate^{72,73}, an excessive focus on it can obscure legitimate conflicts between values. Policymakers in the EU and elsewhere should not be blinded by the belief that mis- and disinformation is the root cause of all disagreements. There is a need to reflect more broadly on the different views on values and beliefs of citizens rather than leaping to the conclusion that they are misinformed.

Overall, legitimate conflicts between values and values trade-offs, as well as dislikes of other groups based on out-group bias or simple dislike, amplified by the myside bias, play a major role

in democracies. In excess, these issues are often labelled as polarisation. The scientific literature defines two main types of polarisation: issue and affective. Issue polarisation is based on attitudes or opinions towards specific policies, such as whether a higher minimum wage is right or wrong. Affective polarisation, in contrast, is an emotional dislike of others based more on identity. Positions on issues and the groups citizens identify with are of course inextricably linked to the values prioritised by citizens.

Some degree of polarisation can be beneficial in encouraging political engagement, productive disagreement, and competition between ideas and debate, especially in the case of issue polarisation. However, extreme polarisation, particularly the affective kind, tends to increase intergroup hatred – or even violence – stereotyping and obscures common ground.

Extreme polarisation can:

- i. lead to a lack of acceptance of political compromise and deliberation^{74,75};
- ii. decrease institutional trust, making governing more difficult^{76,77};
- iii. affect the interpretation of facts and the degree to which facts influence opinions^{62,78};
- iv. awaken authoritarian predispositions⁷⁹;
- v. lead to the dehumanisation and demonisation of the opposing side^{80,81}; and
- vi. dismantle citizens' abilities to hold politicians to account by encouraging double standards in the judgement of questionable political behaviour^{82,83}.

To date, most empirical research on the consequences of polarisation has focused on the United States of America. The high level of polarisation in the USA has been well documented⁸⁴ and culminated in the storming of Capitol Hill on 6 January 2021. Such events should not, however, be dismissed by European readers as uniquely American. Chapter 4 will delve deeper into the evidence on polarisation in Europe,

but it shows that the affective polarisation levels in the USA are not exceptional⁸⁵⁻⁹⁰.

In order to better understand the causes and effects of polarisation, a deeper understanding of values and identities is needed. Given the change in the lines of political conflict, the increased importance of values, as well as rising polarisation, Chapter 2 provides support for a deeper understanding of values, how they relate to identities and Identity politics, and how these, in turn, relate to polarisation.

Both values and self-identification are much more difficult to measure than economic preferences, but this report attempts to help policymakers take these increasingly important factors into account in their political decision-making process.

“Others may simply have different value priorities, which can legitimately lead both sides to conclude something different from the same evidence.”

KEY FINDINGS

- On the issues people care about the most, their own values and views from their social groups automatically colour their own views and beliefs in the facts themselves.
- It is very difficult to reach consensus on evidence independently of convictions for the most contested and, consequently, the most important policy issues.
- It is easy to find illogical arguments in others, but not necessarily in oneself.
- Myside bias presents a particular trap for the elites, as it is not mitigated by intelligence, political sophistication or the tendency to display actively open-minded thinking.
- There is an urgent need to understand and recognise that others may simply have different value priorities, which can legitimately lead both sides to conclude something different from the same evidence.
- Myside bias is a central challenge to evidence-informed policymaking.
- People tend to exaggerate the influence of personality on the behaviour of others without taking the contextual circumstances and social pressures that lead to the behaviour into account (fundamental attribution error).
- Policymakers in the EU and elsewhere should not be blinded by the belief that mis- and disinformation is the root cause of all disagreements.
- Extreme polarisation, particularly the affective kind, tends to increase intergroup hatred or even violence, stereotyping and obscures the common ground.
- European readers should not dismiss polarisation as uniquely American. Research in Europe shows that the affective polarisation levels in the USA are not exceptional.



Person playing golf while wildfire rages in background. Washington, USA. September 2017.

UNDERSTANDING THE VALUES AND SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF EU CITIZENS

■ 2.1. Unity in diversity?

Values have long been debated in philosophy, ethics and society at large. They are said to represent the ‘dominating forces in life’⁹¹. At the same time, values are broad and abstract concepts, difficult to grasp and prone to vague appeals from citizens and politicians alike. Ultimately, values are a blend of biological and evolutionary factors coupled with individual and societal histories^{4,5,92,93}.


Research on the nature of values is still evolving in several disciplines^{94–97}. Personal values describe the consistent preference people have for one direction over another based upon underlying stable, core motivations, such as Safety, Belonging, Esteem and Self-direction^{97,98}. The two most prominent recent theories of values are the Basic Human Values theory of Shalom Schwartz^{8,99} and the theory of ‘materialist’ and ‘post-materialist’ societal values of Ronald Inglehart^{16,28,100}. Both are built on Maslow’s pyramid of needs^{101–103}.

The ‘personal values’ concept at the heart of Basic Human Values has significant empirical support – this gold standard has been validated in over 200 samples from 80 countries^{104–106}, and is the foundation for the insights in this report.

All values are seen as positive by almost all citizens. Only the *relative* importance of, or priority given to, a value matters when forming attitudes or guiding behaviour.

Importantly, this concept allows policymakers to better understand the values of both individuals and societal groups at an aggregate level.

Figure 4 shows the structured model of personal values derived from empirical survey data and the complementary and conflictual relationships between different personal values. The inner ring shows 19 different values such as Tradition, Hedonism and Achievement. The closer any two values are to each other on the circle, the

Figure 4: Personal values model as presented in Schwartz et al. (2012).⁹⁹

more likely they are to be shared by the same individual. For example, placing a similar value on both Hedonism and Stimulation is more likely than valuing both Hedonism and Humility equally. In the same way that the continuous colour spectrum is divided somewhat arbitrarily into named colours (violet, indigo, blue), the named categories of values are somewhat arbitrary ways to divide up the continuum of values. The labelling is helpful to grasp the motivational value conflicts and trade-offs in society⁸.















Each of the values represents a set of goals. For example, the goals for the value Tradition are respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas of one's culture or religion^{8,99}. The motivations behind each value are presented in Table 2.






These 19 core personal values can be usefully aggregated into four higher order values: Openness to change, Conservation, Self-enhancement

and Self-transcendence. Given that each quadrant of higher order values indicates a direction, they represent broader orientations or dimensions of values. Self-transcendence and Conservation have a social focus, while Openness to change and Self-enhancement have a stronger personal and individual focus.

“ If a policy preference is based on a value then it may be seen as more legitimate than if it is based on a fleeting belief or opinion.”

Table 2: Understanding each value and their motivation

Higher order values	Personal value	If this personal value is important, the motivation is expressed as:
Openness to change	Self-direction thought 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Being creative • Forming one's own opinions and have original ideas • Learning things for oneself and improving one's abilities
	Self-direction action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making one's own decisions about life • Doing everything independently • Appreciating the freedom to choose what one does
	Stimulation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Always looking for different kinds of things to do • Seeking excitement in life • Having all sorts of new experiences
	Hedonism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Having a good time • Enjoying life's pleasures • Taking advantage of every opportunity to have fun
Self-enhancement	Achievement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Being ambitious • Seeking success • Wanting people to admire own achievements
	Power dominance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wanting people to do what one says • Aspiring to be the most influential person in any group • Yearning to be the one who tells others what to do
	Power resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Having the feeling of power that money can bring • Being wealthy • Pursue high status and power
	Face 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoiding to be shamed • Protecting one's public image • Wanting people to always treat one with respect and dignity
Conservation	Security personal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoiding anything that might endanger one's safety • Prioritise personal security • Living in secure surroundings
	Security societal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Place importance on one country's ability to protect itself against all threats • Wanting the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens • Appreciate order and stability in society
	Conformity interpersonal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoiding to upset other people • Thinking it is important never to be annoying to anyone • Always trying to be tactful and avoid irritating people.
	Conformity rules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Believing one should always do what people in authority say • Following rules even when no one is watching • Obeying all the laws
	Tradition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintaining traditional values or beliefs • Following family customs or the customs of a religion • Valuing the traditional practices of one's culture
	Humility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trying not to draw attention to oneself • Being humble • Being satisfied with what one has and not to ask for more

Higher order values	Personal value	If this personal value is important, the motivation is expressed as:
Self-transcendence	Benevolence dependability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Being loyal to those who are close • Going out of one's way to be a dependable and trustworthy friend • Wanting to be completely reliable to those one spends time with
	Benevolence caring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Helping the people dear to one • Caring for the well-being of people one is close to • Always trying to be responsive to the needs of one's family and friends
	Benevolence concern 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protecting the weak and vulnerable members of society • Finding it important that every person in the world have equal opportunities in life • Wanting everyone to be treated justly, even people one doesn't know
	Universalism tolerance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working to promote harmony and peace among diverse groups • Listening to people who are different • Seeking to understand people, even if one disagrees with them
	Universalism nature 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Believing strongly one should care for nature • Working against threats to the world of nature • Protecting the natural environment from destruction or pollution

With regard to the approach to societal values (Inglehart), the underlying conflicts in societies boil down to a conflict continuum between materialism values (e.g. security and economic stability), which relate to the Self-enhancement and Conservation values in the personal values model, and the post-materialism values (e.g. freedom of speech), which are closer to Self-transcendence and Openness to change values. This approach is useful, because it builds on a long running dataset from the World Values Survey and allows for inferences across time which the personal values lack^{16,28,34,100}.

Many other concepts are often referred to or used synonymously with values. Distinguishing between personal values and these other terms is helpful to policymakers, because if a policy preference is based on a value then it may be seen as more legitimate than if it is based on a fleeting belief or opinion. The following distinctions have been suggested between values and other terms (also see the Glossary):

- World views describe the general view of how the world is, for example the world is a 'competitive jungle' in which everyone has to look out for themselves¹⁰⁷.
- Ideologies are more specific to the political realm, combining worldviews, values and views of how the world should be into one¹⁰⁸.
- Values are different from attitudes or opinions in that values are more stable and fundamental to citizens^{109,110}.
- Values are abstract in contrast to social norms. Social norms define a concrete, specific behaviour as a standard and/or evaluate it as desirable in society, such as whether it is acceptable to cross a street at a red light or not^{29,111}.
- Values differ from personality traits. Where values describe who one wants to be, traits describe who one is^{112,113}. People are satisfied with their values and want to change them less than their personality traits¹¹².
- Values differ from morals as morals combine several elements such as values, norms, practices and identities in order to make cooperation within societies possible¹¹⁴.

“All values are seen as positive by almost all citizens. Only the relative importance of or priority given to a value matters when forming attitudes or guiding behaviour.very interested in politics.”

Personal values for evaluating attitudes and policies

The benefit of the personal values theory to policymakers is that it:

- provides a guide to how values relate to each other;
- identifies the terms people use to describe values;
- explains how different values relate to political orientations.

Figure 5 distils several findings from the literature into one infographic that can be used to reflect upon policy issues using different values lenses. People usually find almost all of the values positive, but some more than others. Looking explicitly at an issue from a values perspective enables a decision-maker to focus on essential perspectives, such as illuminating underlying trade-offs and ways to encourage and communicate initiatives more clearly.

The final important element of the personal values theory is that it is not the absolute endorsement of the value that matters in terms of forming subsequent attitudes and behaviours, because all values are seen as positive by almost all citizens¹¹⁵. Only the relative importance of, or priority given to a value matters when forming attitudes or guiding

EXAMPLE UNDERSTANDING SELF-DIRECTION

Value: Self-direction

Subtype: Can either be focused on action or thought

Higher order value: Openness to change

Associated terms: Curious, Freedom and Independent

Personal vs. societal focus (social identity): More on the personal side

Strives for: Individual freedom over the contrasting values of Tradition, Conformity and Security, which have a stronger in-group focus

behaviour, especially when a policy or action is related to conflicting values^{8,115-119}. The relationship between values through attitudes to behaviour, particularly for very specific issues, is never deterministic, because other factors also affect behaviours, such as beliefs, self-control, habits, peer and group pressures, budget constraints, etc¹¹⁹.

APPLYING VALUES AND IDENTITIES TO POLICYMAKING

For any policy initiative, ask yourself 'How does it correspond to citizens' most important values in life?'

This figure will help you think in a structured way about different values based on a model replicated in over 200 samples in 80 countries.

1 What are the core values of citizens?

Citizens' values can be divided into four general directions ('higher order values: Self-transcendence, Openness to change, Conservation, Self-enhancement').

What to do:

Think about how the policy problem is seen through the lens of each value. For example, how is someone who values Self-enhancement thinking about the facts, what would they like to know? What is their top concern?

2 Can we be more precise?

Going deeper will help you design policy that respects citizens' values. Each of the general value directions summarises several personal values.

What to do:

- Ask yourself 'What would a preferred solution to the problem look like through each of the values lenses?'
- What solutions would be especially problematic?
- Are there solutions for all values or is a trade-off needed?

3 How to communicate policies?

Learning about how citizens and politicians describe policies in values terms will help make sense of the debate and communicate better.

What to do:

Listen to the debate about the policy issue and identify the values terms used. What values are expressed and how do they relate to each other? Where are values in tension? Apply this in own your communication.




Figure 5: Infographic on how to think through values and identities in policymaking.

Sources: Barli, A., Jaspal, R., Polek, E., & Schwartz, S. (2014). Values and identity process theory (IPT): theoretical integration and empirical interactions. In R. Jaspal & G. M. Breakwell (Eds.), *Identity process theory: Identity, social action and social change*. Torres, C., Verkasalo, M., ... Zaleski, Z. (2014). Basic Personal Values Underlie and Give Coherence to Political Values: A Cross National Study in 15 Countries. *Political Behavior*, 36(4), 899–930. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9255-z> • Schwartz, g/10.1002/ejsp.2228 • Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., Ramos, A., Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J. E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., & Konty, M. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 25(C), 1–65. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60281-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6) • Skirmina, E., Cieciuch, J., Schwartz, S. H., Davidov, E., & Algesheimer, R. (2019). Behavioral Signatures of Values in Everyday Behavior in Retrospective and Real-Time Settings.

5

4

3

2

1

Individual or group superiority

Security


Blind patriotism

Pro military intervention

National security

Family security

Healthy



HOW VALUES WORK

Opposition effect



Conservation


If one value is very important for a person, he/she is **less likely to attach importance to values further away on the circle**

Complementarity effect




If one value is very important for a person, he/she is **more likely to attach importance to nearby values on the circle.**

Instantiation effect



Connecting policies to citizens' values can help make policies more effective and more understandable.

Values to social identity



Some people are more prone to be interested in group perspectives than others. Values reflect this fact.

Keep social identities in mind!

Values are important, but citizens also care about what their social groups think and how they are affected. Social groups include family, local or religious communities, national identity as well as political parties.

What to do:

Think about which groups are important to a policy issue, which are likely to enter the debate or be affected.



Free enterprise

What's the big picture in politics?

For each value, studies have shown a correlation to major political attitudes. Knowing these allows you to navigate hotly debated issues.

What to do:

Understand the values behind each political attitude and learn how to address them when designing policies.



European Commission


From theory to practice – the personal values of EU citizens

Much of the personal values theory emphasises the relation between values and their consistency on average across societies. However, for policymakers, it is also important to know how important each of the values are within societies. For the purpose of this report, a special Eurobarometer on values and identities was commissioned, providing up-to-date evidence for 27 000 respondents from all Member States. Figure 6 illustrates the extent of overall agreement (or not) with the selected values. It is a subset of personal values covering the most important dimensions from a political perspective.

Self-direction (action) and Benevolence are most highly valued by EU citizens, findings that concur with those found in the scientific literature¹²⁰. Both values are normally high in importance even before COVID-19, but their relevance in situations of health threats and restrictions to individual freedoms remains important to many. In contrast, Power (dominance and wealth) is least valued, which is consistent with pre-COVID-19 times. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume some degree of social desirability bias in the answer patterns, so it does not mean that citizens do not care at all about Power.

Additionally, the endorsement of most values is quite high, which also conforms to the theory.

Figure 6: Personal values priority in the EU.



On a scale from 1 'Not like you at all' to 6 'Very much like you'. Answers from 1-2 are summarised as 'Not like you', 3-4 as 'Somewhat like you' and 5-6 as 'Like you'.

'Questions were personalised by gender. For brevity we only display the male version here'.

Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020.

Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

“ Self-direction (action) and Benevolence are most highly valued by EU citizens. In contrast, Power (dominance and wealth) are least valued.”

On the individual level, there is variation in the ordering of values, and only when they come into conflict on a particular policy preference or issue does the relative ordering of values by individual citizens influence their preference towards one over the other^{8,95}. In other words, value priorities are somewhat context-dependent. To establish a better understanding of what this prioritisation means in practice, Table 3 illustrates a number of conflicting attitudes and behaviours. Based on empirical data, it shows those values that relate most strongly to each. For example, political activism such as boycotting is most often done by citizens who highly value Universalism, Self-direction and Stimulation. In contrast, citizens who highly value Conformity, Tradition and Security usually engage less in this behaviour. The rationale for this is logical, as becoming politically active often involves having to fight against the current status quo, being active and fighting for others or the environment.



Volunteers sorting Christmas clothing for donations in warehouse.

Table 3: Selected relations of values to attitudes and behaviours.

Behaviour	Positively related values	Negatively related values
Political activism (7 actions: e.g. boycotting)	Universalism Self-direction Stimulation	Conformity Tradition Security
Work for voluntary/charitable organisation	Benevolence Self-direction Universalism	Security Power Conformity
Attendance religious services	Tradition Conformity	Self-direction Stimulation Hedonism
Environmentally-friendly behaviour	Universalism Benevolence	Power
Prosocial behaviour	Universalism Benevolence	Power
Creative behaviour (artistic, verbal)	Self-direction Universalism Stimulation	Security Tradition Conformity
Adopting technological innovations	Stimulation Self-direction	Security Tradition Conformity
Delinquent behaviour	Stimulation Hedonism	Benevolence Conformity
Drug use frequency	Stimulation Hedonism	Benevolence Conformity
Risky sexual behaviour	Hedonism Power Stimulation	Universalism Benevolence Security
Interpersonal violence	Power Hedonism	Universalism Benevolence Conformity
Participation in sports (in last 12 months)	Stimulation Hedonism	Security Tradition Conformity
Choosing economics or business major	Power Achievement	Benevolence
Choice of medical specialty - general practice	Benevolence	Power

Table 3 continued

Attitudes	Positively related values	Negatively related values
Opposition to accepting immigrants	Security Conformity	Universalism Self-direction
Interpersonal trust	Benevolence Universalism	Security Power
Importance of work in life	Achievement Power	Tradition Benevolence Universalism
Subjective political efficacy	Self-direction Stimulation	Security Conformity Tradition
Importance job security in choosing job	Security	Stimulation Self-direction
Importance high income in choosing job	Achievement Power	Universalism Benevolence
Importance chances for initiative in choosing job	Self-direction Stimulation	Conformity Tradition
Right-wing authoritarianism	Security Conformity Tradition Power	Universalism Self-direction
Egalitarian gender attitudes	Universalism Self-direction Benevolence	Power Tradition
Worry about meaning in life	Universalism Benevolence Tradition	Stimulation Hedonism
Identifying with one's nation	Tradition Conformity Security	Self-direction Stimulation Hedonism

Source: Schwartz (2016).¹¹⁸

Values at the group level

It is important to distinguish between the priority given to certain values over values of an individual and the plurality of value priorities that prevail in any kind of group or society^{8,27}. At the group and societal level, the prevailing values interact with personal values to influence attitudes and behaviour¹²¹.

The predominant values in a group or society as a whole – sometimes called group or societal values – become important in their own right because they have a normative influence on the individual citizen. *Personal* values relate the strongest to behaviour for which there are no strong social norms¹²². In comparison, *group* values are particularly relevant for publicly visible conformity behaviour. These values can override personal priorities of values because citizens^{17,105,119,123}:

- want to belong;
- identify with a group;
- fear being ostracised or punished.


For example, avoiding public arguments or spending more than one can afford closely correlates with the perceived value priority of Conformity in *society*, rather than the *individual value* priority¹²³. Aggregating individual level values by group or country not only helps understand the interaction between individuals and society but also provides a comparison in the main value differences between groups or between countries that might be useful to policymakers²⁷.

It is also at the group level that changes in values over time become relevant for policymakers. Values are highly stable over time at the individual level⁹ and are mostly shaped by life conditions during childhood, adolescence and early adulthood through the influence of parents, neighbours, friends and schools^{8,15,124}. They are also potentially heritable^{125–128}.

“Values are highly stable over time at the individual level. When values shift at a societal level, the shift is therefore driven by cohort or generational changes.”

When values shift at a societal level, the shift is therefore driven by cohort or generational changes^{35,129,130}. For example, Figure 7 shows the difference of the percentage of people per cohort who hold post-materialism v materialism values in 6 western European countries. The share of post-materialists is higher in each following generation, consistent with the theory of modernisation mentioned above. At the same time, the differences between generations remain mostly stable over time. In the longer term, although slow changes in values will probably materialise as generations change, policymakers faced with shorter time frames will need to address the diversity of values, rather than anticipating that it will soon disappear and can be ignored.

Figure 7: Cohort analysis of values orientation, 1971–2008, 6 west European countries (UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands).



Source: Inglehart (2018).¹⁵¹

KEY FINDINGS

- Values are a blend of biological and evolutionary factors coupled with individual and societal histories.
- Personal values describe the consistent preference people have for one direction over another based upon underlying stable, core motivations.
- Derived from empirical study data, the values circle illustrates the complementary and/or conflictual relationships between different personal values.
- The closer two values are to each other, the more alike they are from an individual's perspective.
- A broader values perspective can be described by the 4 higher order values; Openness to change, Conservation, Self-enhancement and Self-transcendence.
- Only the relative importance of a value matters when forming attitudes or guiding behaviour, especially when a policy or action is related to conflicting values.
- The values that citizens feel most aligned with in the dedicated Eurobarometer are Self-direction (action) and Benevolence.
- The predominant values in a group or society as a whole become important in their own right because they have a normative influence on the individual citizen.
- Values are highly stable at the individual level and are mostly shaped by life conditions during childhood, adolescence and early adulthood through the influence of parents, neighbours, friends and schools. They are also potentially heritable.
- When values shift at a societal level, the shift is therefore driven by cohort or generational changes.

■ 2.2. From values to policy preferences, political orientation and affiliation

Understanding personal values is important because it is necessary to know what drives citizens' attitudes and behaviour in order to formulate policies that can be most effective. However, politics is also an integral part of policymaking and so the relationship between values and how public political decisions are negotiated, argued and taken is also important. For this, it is important to understand citizens' political orientations and affiliations, and how they relate to personal values. Both connections follow similar rules.

Individual values to policy preferences

Due to their abstract nature, values need to be interpreted in context, also known as 'instantiation'. Individuals need, to some extent, see or intuit a connection between the value and subsequent attitude or behaviour¹³²⁻¹³⁴. In many cases, there is a common understanding of a value, but the connection is potentially flexible and is constructed through the individual's expectations and experience with media and culture. This means that, especially at the international level, the understanding of the values should be complemented with culturally specific knowledge of their associations, e.g. through networks, studying the respective media and in the political context, understanding the way policies are usually framed.

“ Politics is also an integral part of policymaking and so the relationship between values and how public political decisions are negotiated, argued and taken is important.”



■ CASE STUDY: THE CASE OF COVID-19 AND VALUES

New situations require new values instantiations, which are subject to framing

Although the scientific perspective on the relation between values and COVID-19 is just emerging^{135,136}, initial findings illustrate how new situations require instantiations of people's values, and how flexible the link between values and behaviours can be.

How values relate to COVID mitigation behaviours

Behaviours intended to contain COVID-19 are simple to understand but in early 2020, these were new for most citizens. Habits were not in place and, due to the time pressure, people did not have the chance to build substantial links between abstract values and concrete behaviours. Therefore, messaging from politicians, the media and other sources influenced the perception of the effectiveness and meaning of these behaviours.

In several countries, the higher order values of Self-transcendence and Conservation are associated with behaviours mitigating the spread of COVID-19, such as personal hygiene¹³⁷ and social distancing^{138,139}. This makes sense because values such as caring about close ones (Benevolence), the society at large (Universalism) and conforming to rules and norms (Conformity) all have an obvious link to COVID-related behaviours. However, this does not mean that the link is equally strong for everyone.

One study shows that viewing certain news outlets on the right political spectrum in the USA caused many more infections and deaths^{140,141}. From a values perspective, this is surprising, because right-wing political orientation usually relates to Conservation values, such as Security, and Conformity. However, emerging research suggests that these media outlets have successfully cast doubt on the belief that washing hands and staying at home are beneficial to one's own

safety (Security), for the well-being of close ones (Benevolence) and society overall (Universalism)¹⁴². Consequently, these media outlets seem to have successfully challenged the link between Security, Conformity and Benevolence values and COVID related protective behaviours, in other words, these behaviours are perceived less as instantiations of those values.

This finding is in line with research about conspiracy theories around COVID-19 in Germany. It found that such theories are held more strongly by citizens on the far-right, but not those highly endorsing the value of Conformity¹⁴³. Similarly, UK citizens¹⁴⁴ most strongly opposing restrictions on civil liberties to protect others are those highly valuing Hedonism, Stimulation, Achievement and Power, but not Tradition, Conformity and Security. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that trying to assign protesters to a one-dimensional ideology may ultimately misinterpret intentions of at least some, which policymakers will have to address if they want to successfully change behaviours to tackle COVID-19.

What it means for policymaking and communication

A study by Lake et al. (2021) examined how well various messages employing values persuaded Australian citizens. A message targeting Self-transcendence ('Social distance now. Do this to care for your loved ones and vulnerable people.') was rated the most persuasive. However, the message was less effective for people high in Self-enhancement values (which include Power, Achievement and Hedonism), and messages based on the other values increased in persuasiveness, but were still less persuasive overall than that of Self-transcendence¹³⁸.

Knowing the inherent link between values and certain behaviours enables policymakers to understand who is likely to support or oppose certain policies. This may lead to finding new compromises, but also ways to communicate effectively or guide the distribution of resources.

The need to link values to instantiations has implications for the choice and design of policy instruments. Policies can be framed in values terms to be better understood by citizens through that lens. If a policy strives to enable or promote a certain behaviour that seems consistent with peoples' values, then clearly highlighting the connection between the value and the behaviour, for example through an informational campaign, may be enough.

However, if there is no direct value-to-behaviour connection or the underlying value is not strongly endorsed, then other measures may be more promising. For example, many citizens seem to clearly see the connection between caring for nature and recycling, which makes them engage in the activity. This link may be more difficult for other behaviours, such as using scrap paper or using the energy-saving mode of a computer¹³³. Raising the salience of caring for nature to participants in a study therefore did not increase the latter behaviours¹³³.

Clearly connecting the values to behaviours in policymaking therefore has the potential to increase policy effectiveness in changing behaviour. A way forward in policymaking is to not only ask people about their values and attitudes, but also to ask for typical situations and instances for which values are relevant¹⁴⁵. Consultations and engagement with citizens and stakeholders can provide good opportunities to do this, especially in policy areas where the value-to-policy connection is less clear or more conflicted. Furthermore, engaging with citizens at large may also allow the joint creation and negotiation of these instantiations, rather than only uncovering or imposing them.

Finally, different values may also motivate the same behaviours. Environmentally friendly behaviour such as installing solar panels or avoiding waste, although strongly tied to the value of caring for nature (Universalism nature), can also be performed out of different value motivations.

“ Clearly connecting the values to behaviours in policymaking therefore has the potential to increase policy effectiveness in changing behaviour.”

For Self-enhancement-focused individuals, the primary motivation to engage in environmentally friendly behaviours is the beneficial consequences for oneself. People endorsing the values of Conformity may find societal norms and regulations important, as well as following policy initiatives and their peers. In comparison, those who prioritise Security can stress concerns about energy independence, especially where energy supply is less dependable^{146,147}. Understanding the values diversity of citizens may therefore raise new possibilities in designing policies, integrate those perspectives and increase their impact.


From values to political orientation and affiliations

In addition to personal values being a good way to measure values across societies, they can also help policymakers infer citizens' general political orientations or ideologies^{104,106,148}.

The likely pathway from individuals' characteristics or traits to their final political choice is shown in Figure 8^{24,107,149,150}. While there is still debate about this pathway^{92,151}, it can be used as a heuristic to understand the direction of influence for values on political behaviour^{120,152}. Traits seem to be the starting point, influencing values directly but not the other way round¹⁵³. While they are more stable than values, their effect on political orientation is fully mediated through values indicating that, for policymakers, it is more useful to focus on values¹⁵⁰.

Personal values relate to downstream political attitudes. For example, Figure 9 shows the results from a study of citizens in Italy, replicated in 15 western countries about how personal values correlate with many important political topics used to describe the main political conflict lines, such as accepting immigrants, equality, or views towards military interventions^{152,154}.

Figure 8: Schematic values to political behaviour pathway, explaining the likely direction of influence in determining peoples' political behaviour through values.




The strongest correlation between equality (e.g. 'Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed') exists with the value of Universalism. Universalism correlates the least with the endorsement of free enterprise (e.g. 'The less government gets involved with business and the economy, the better off this country will be')^{152,155,156}.

Personal values are also found to be more stable than political attitudes. For example, in an Italian

are more susceptible to persuasion, which can be in line with partisan loyalty⁵⁰.

Another good way to think about values as a policymaker is to think about how citizens perceive political priorities, for example when asked about the challenges facing governments or the EU. New evidence from the dedicated Eurobarometer is illustrated in Figure 10. Here the citizens' values profiles are plotted in relation to whether they have selected a certain item to be a major challenge for the EU. The figure does not reveal the attitudes

Figure 9: Relationship between personal values and affirmation of selected political attitudes.



Source: Schwartz et al. (2010).¹⁵⁷

election cycle, Schwartz et al. show a clear directional relation from personal values over citizens' political attitudes to explaining voting behaviour. Importantly, the same study highlighted that when parties changed their positions, citizens also changed their political attitudes while their personal values stayed the same^{154,158,159}. This is evidence that personal values underlie political attitudes, illustrating that political orientations

of citizens towards these issues, but whether they find them relevant to be addressed by the EU. Due to the conflictual nature of some values, this can give the reader hints as to whether there is the potential for opposition and polarisation, or if a topic seems to be of interest to only one values dimension.

For example, environmental issues and climate change seem to be of concern to individuals high in Benevolence, all Universalism dimensions and Self-direction, but not on opposing values. In this case, someone with a certain values profile cares a lot, while those with opposing values may seem less engaged. Given the scale of the climate and environmental challenges facing the EU, *engaging* people with values other than Universalism from the outset is likely to be essential to win support for the policy changes required.

In contrast, the topic of terrorism and security is of particular interest to people with the values

of Tradition, Personal and Societal security as well as Self-direction action and thought, which are opposing on the values circle. Consequently, conflict resolution and finding compromises that address those with different values profiles may be very important to find a solution that gains widespread support.

At the same time, it is important to reiterate that people do not just have one value, but generally share all or many of the values in question to some extent. There is underlying common ground for compromise, but in conflictual situations, values may come into opposition and the profiles will give

Figure 10: Spider-web representation of values profiles for different mentions of challenges to the EU.



- Chosen to be a major challenge for the EU
- Not chosen to be a major challenge for the EU

Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020. Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

some new perspectives on policy issues that may be less obvious.

Politics, rhetoric, persuasion and values

The political side of the policymaking process can be described as a constant struggle to persuade and argue for or against certain policies¹¹. This back and forth in persuasion and argumentation is expressed through language and in the media. In the study of rhetoric, it has been recognised since Aristotle (Ethos, Pathos, Logos) that in order to persuade, a speaker needs more than facts and evidence. Scientific studies suggest that appeals to values can change attitudes because values represent what is aspirational and appreciated^{160–162}.

Values are ‘the “glue” of the political translation process that binds together citizens’ political attachments’¹⁶³. Values and value differences may be overemphasised in talk about policies and this can have an effect on public opinion¹⁶¹. The identity of the speaker and perceived values they represent is however important for the audience¹⁶¹. Using values in communication in policymaking may allow policymakers to simplify

complex policies and sway citizens’ opinions, but in order to do so, decision-makers must address citizens’ underlying values ethically.

Before engaging in such activities, an important point needs to be made about the extent of political sophistication^{51,164}. Many policymakers consider that they are more knowledgeable and better informed about policies, thus making policies based on evidence rather than values or ideologies. However, the opposite seems to be true, especially for complex issues. Evidence shows that for such issues, connecting the underlying values to specific policies is most likely to be through the discourse of elites in the media¹⁶⁵.

Consequently, individuals following these narratives (often labelled as ‘politically sophisticated’ individuals), may make a stronger connection between values and policies than the average citizens^{166–169}. In other words, these sophisticated individuals are more likely to have made direct connections between values and policies. Furthermore, because the myside bias effect is not mitigated through intelligence or political sophistication, negotiating policy between policymakers, experts and politicians may well involve more value judgements than for ordinary citizens, even if more evidence is used at the same time to support what in reality are values debates. Policymakers should ensure that rhetoric about evidence-based policymaking (‘What works’, ‘Alternativlos’) is not obscuring real conflicts between values and values trade-offs that should be debated in public.

In sum, values are important not only for explaining attitudes and (indirectly) behaviours of citizens, but also for explaining their political orientations. As such, they serve the dual purpose for policymakers to understand what people want in life and in politics, and how values diversity should be taken into account in policy decisions. This also begs the larger question of how the important type of EU values relates to the personal values presented in this section.

“ Values are ‘the “glue” of the political translation process that binds together citizens’ political attachments’ ”

Lupton et al. 2020, p.242.

KEY FINDINGS

- Due to their abstract nature, values need to be contextualised, also known as ‘instantiation’.
- In many cases, there is a broad, common understanding of a value, but the connection can vary through an individual’s personal expectations and experience with media and culture.
- Clearly connecting the values to behaviours in policymaking therefore has the potential to increase policy effectiveness in changing behaviour.
- A way forward in policymaking is to not only ask people about their values and attitudes, but also to ask for typical situations and instances for which values are relevant.
- Different values may motivate the same behaviours.
- There is an established link between personal values over citizens’ political attitudes to explaining voting behaviour.
- While personality traits are more stable than values, their effect on political orientation is fully mediated through values, indicating that, for policymakers, it is appropriate to focus on the values.
- Importantly, when parties change their positions, citizens also change their political attitudes while their personal values stayed the same.
- Appeals to values can change attitudes because values represent what is aspirational and appreciated.
- Values are ‘the “glue” of the political translation process that binds together citizens’ political attachments’.¹⁶³
- Because the myside bias effect is not mitigated through intelligence or political sophistication, negotiating policy between policymakers, experts and politicians may well involve more value judgements than for ordinary citizens, even if more evidence is used at the same time.



2.3. EU values and their relation to personal values

Table 4: EU values of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.

'The Union is founded on the values of...'	Respect for human dignity
	Freedom
	Democracy
	Equality
	Rule of law
'These values are common to the Member States in a society in which ... prevail'	Respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities
	Pluralism
	Non-discrimination
	Tolerance
	Justice
	Solidarity
	Equality between men and women

EU values (see Table 4), enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaties, are guiding principles for EU policy-makers. The values are codified in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In support of this, the European Commission is tasked with promoting the values and 'to promote peace, its values^{ix} and the well-being of its peoples'^x.

EU values, in contrast to personal values mentioned before, have a specific legal character as tangible principles¹⁷⁰ and are already measured and monitored, for example, through the EU Justice scoreboard or the annual rule of law report^{xi}. The meanings of the EU values resemble some of the psychological foundations of personal values, but do not represent the full spectrum of values diversity. Therefore, this section focuses on the support for EU values and their relation to personal values to clarify the deeper psychological relation EU citizens have towards EU values.

“EU values have a specific legal character as tangible principles. The meanings of the EU values resemble some of the psychological foundations of personal values, but do not represent the full spectrum of values diversity.”


EU values are increasingly called upon as an argument for supporting the EU, especially in times of crisis calling for a *community of values*¹⁷¹. They often provide tangible benefits to citizens in their legal form, for example through the freedom of movement within EU borders. These benefits are valued by citizens, but that does not mean that these values function in the same way as personal values. Taking a closer look at EU values, some of them clearly closely relate to personal values, such as Equality and Tolerance, while others are more technical in nature, such as rule of law and democracy.

EU values are directly implemented in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, so for the purposes of the dedicated Eurobarometer, questions were designed based on the charter. Citizens were asked how much they agree with certain 'principles', without referring to them as EU values to avoid prompting the image of the EU.

^{ix} https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/sites/comm-cwt2019/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mission-letter-jourova-2019-2024_en.pdf

^x https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

^{xi} https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en and https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law_en

Figure 11: Extent of EU values agreement in the EU.

On a scale from 0 "Totally disagree" to 10 "Totally agree". Answers from 0-3 are summarized as "Disagree", 4-6 as "Neither agree, nor disagree" and 7-10 as "Agree"

Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020.
Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

Respondents were asked: 'The following is a list of principles that may be important in our society. Using a scale from 0 to 10, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? '0' means that you 'totally disagree' and '10' means that you 'totally agree'. Figure 11 shows the extent of the agreement with the statements at EU level. In short, EU values measured this way have very high levels of support across the EU.

The principle most highly supported by EU citizens is the independence of courts and the right to a fair trial, followed by the independence of judges, with agreement of 83% and 82% respectively and only about 5% disagreeing for each. The items with the lowest support are the right to asylum and the


rejection of the death penalty with 66% and 57% agreement each, but even there the disagreement was low with 10% and 16% respectively. Overall, based upon the questions asked, the vast majority of EU citizens strongly support EU values as laid out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Despite the seemingly different nature of the questions asked, statistical analysis of the data reveals that they seem to have one underlying common factor, meaning that they are understood in a similar fashion. This allows for the analysis to be done on an index rather than each question independently. Figure 12 shows the average agreement with all the EU values items aggregated on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 means totally

agree with all items and 0 would mean total disagreement with all items. The variation between EU Member States is not very large with the highest agreement at 0.86 in Cyprus and Spain and lowest in Romania and Lithuania at 0.72 and 0.73 respectively. Overall, there are statistically significant differences, but they do not seem to be pronounced in absolute terms. In conclusion, on average, there is no fundamental difference between EU countries when it comes to citizens agreeing with EU values.

Finally, it is important to see where the values fit into the personal values dimension to provide an indication of potential tensions between EU values and underlying psychological motivations. Looking at associations between the importance of personal values and the support for EU values can therefore provide indication beyond the absolute levels of support for EU values, which underlying motivations may support or conflict with the EU values as perceived by citizens.

Figure 12: Map of agreement with EU values index by country.



Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020.
Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

The most obvious dimension in support of EU values falls into the higher order values of Self-transcendence (containing for example Benevolence, Universalism tolerance and concern) and Openness to change (containing for example Self-direction). Freedom, Equality (general and gender-specific), Human rights, Pluralism, Non-discrimination, and Tolerance are either directly or indirectly covered in the personal values model by Universalism. In comparison, Justice, Democracy and Rule of law can be at the intersection between legal principles and universal appeal. For example, justice could be interpreted as universal rights, independence of states, or respecting international law and histories¹⁷². It is less clear how these relate to personal values. For example, over time, the EU values may be regarded as traditional and therefore connected to the higher order value of Conservation. Nevertheless, just because the values are enshrined in the Treaties, does not mean that they are exclusive to the EU, nor that supporting them is equivalent with support for the European Union.

Using multi-dimensional scaling, Figure 13 presents a summary graph combining the questions on personal and EU values from the dedicated Eurobarometer. The graph represents the relationships between the different values, where each value is located on the graph relative to its relationship with other values. The closer two values are, the more similar they are in the eyes of citizens, and the further apart they are, the more conflictual they are perceived to be. The personal values find themselves in a circular structure, mostly consistent with the theory outlined in the academic literature. Values of Conservation oppose Openness to change, and Self-transcendence opposes Self-enhancement. Unlike in most other studies, the values of Self-direction (action and thought) have come to be close to values of Self-transcendence. This may be a result of the impact of COVID-19. Although the theory of values would predict the values' relation to each other being stable across societies and time, the massive scale of COVID-19


repercussions may redefine their relations to each other at least in the immediate term.

The significant finding is that EU values are close to the Self-transcendence values. Consistent with expectations, they are more in line with the perceptions of valuing Universalism (tolerance, concern, nature) and Benevolence (dependability and caring), as well as Self-direction. It also illustrates that the primary oppositional values are in the quadrant of self-enhancement (furthest apart from the EU values point). Overall, citizens strongly focused on Power and Wealth have the greatest motivational tension with EU values. Conservation values are also somewhat negatively related, but less than Self-enhancement.

Implications for EU policymaking

In general, support for EU values is high everywhere in the EU. The highest support comes for the rule of law elements in the survey, which may be related to the salience of the topic at the time of the survey (end of 2020/2021), where the Rule of Law was a major conflict point in the discussions around the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027. The agreement is also high in countries where these values have recently been on the political agenda, which means that the view of the population may be more favourable than otherwise perceived (Hungary 88% agreement and Poland 74% agreement). The only items that seem to be less strongly supported are on the death penalty, which reaches disagreement as high as 37% in some countries (Slovenia and Latvia), and the right to asylum as stated in the charter, with disagreement as high as 22% (Czechia).

The largest motivational tension with EU values comes from the personal value of Self-enhancement. This value usually reflects the motivation to get ahead and the needs of self-esteem and material wealth. These values have also been previously associated with deficiency needs¹⁷³, meaning it relates to an individual's unfulfilled needs. The value is generally

Figure 13: The link between personal values and EU values using multi-dimensional scaling.

Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020.
Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143..

higher for citizens with lower levels of education and higher levels of economic difficulties. It may be important to look at the reasons why some people have unfulfilled needs of self-esteem and material wealth in relation to the EU. To reinforce support for EU values, it might be worth highlighting EU policies that alleviate conditions that traditionally lead to such needs, e.g. tackling unemployment, reskilling, occupational prestige for lower educated workers.

Furthermore, Conservation values are also further away from EU values, although the opposition is weaker compared to Self-enhancement values. Balancing values such as Tradition, Conformity and Security with EU values is a difficult task. Evidence from other studies shows that citizens who rank high in these values are in danger of becoming an out-group, rejecting and looking for a leader that can bring back 'order', especially

when perceptions of threat are high^{35,79}. It is important to take these values fully into account if EU values – and especially its legal principles of rule of law and democracy – are to prevail. Reducing feelings of economic and cultural insecurity as well as threat – which can come from multiple directions – suggest upholding traditions and symbols that validate belonging, essential in the response to this potential values conflict.

These results call for care when speaking of the EU as a ‘Community of values’. Values can be interpreted very differently, and people may also have other values. While there is a large degree of support for EU values, this does not imply a similar degree of homogeneity of underlying personal values and an absence of potential personal values conflicts. To speak about the ‘Community of values’ might thus alienate those who do not feel that their personal values are fully represented by the EU, especially when they understand some of the EU values through different lenses as stated by different politicians. Careful

use of the ‘Community of values’ narrative is recommended as well as differentiating between values and principles. To illustrate, defending the rule of law by appealing to the ‘Community of values’ has different implications to justifying a specific vertical policy position on, for example, the environment or immigration when using the same community narrative. Such distinctions could help avoid the exclusion of significant groups from a broader, shared identity.

Overall, the partial flexibility of understanding how personal values relate to EU values, attitudes and policies opens the door for policy framing. Political elites and the media are engaged in connecting values to policies all the time, but in that they are competing for the framing. Understanding whose value framings citizens believe is therefore essential to understanding what values are most prominent in discourse. A powerful determinant of who citizens trust is understanding who is in their in-group, and who is in the out-group. In other words, what is their social identity?

KEY FINDINGS

- The EU values, enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaties, are important guiding principles for many policymakers in the EU.
- The values are codified in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In support of this, the European Commission is tasked ‘to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’.
- The meanings of the EU values resemble some of the psychological foundations of personal values, but do not represent the full spectrum of values diversity.
- Overall, based upon the questions asked, the vast majority of EU citizens strongly support EU values as laid out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
- The principle most highly supported by EU citizens is the independence of courts and the right to a fair trial, followed by the independence of judges.
- The principles with the lowest support are the right to asylum and the rejection of the death penalty.
- On average, there is no fundamental difference between EU countries when it comes to agreeing with the EU values.
- These results call for care when speaking of the EU as a ‘Community of values’. This could help avoid the exclusion of large groups from a broader shared identity.

■ 2.4. Social identities as magnifiers of values and political conflict

■ 2.4.1. Social identities as the foundation of modern 'tribes'

Social identities have received enormous attention in recent years as a source of political upheaval, from identity politics to affective polarisation. Identities also play an important role when it comes to who one trusts and follows in politics and life.

There are two important components of identity: personal and social identity.

- **Personal identity** answers the question 'Who am I?' and is based on a person's values, experiences and knowledge, and is mostly perceived to be unique¹⁷⁴.
- **Social identity** responds to the question of 'What am I?', answering which groups or social categories one belongs to¹⁷⁵.

The relevance of personal identity for policymaking comes from the argument that values are at its core¹⁷⁴, therefore when one's values are threatened, it is also true that the sense of self is threatened¹⁷⁶.

Social identification relies on two main factors: categorisation and identification. People intuitively classify others into categories such as male and female, or young and old. These categories allow for rapid understanding and prediction of behaviour, but are also a large source of stereotyping and discrimination¹⁷⁷. People also attach themselves and others to a specific social category determining their own and others' social identity.

Identification of oneself and others into various social groups is human nature¹⁷⁸. Importantly, social identities are entirely subjective^{179,180}. For example, because someone is male or of a certain nationality does not mean he identifies strongly or at all with either group.

A common misconception is that social and personal identities are one and the same, when in fact, social identification can shift a person's behaviour to align with the group by ascribing characteristics, values and qualities of the group to the self and de-personalise their personal identity^{175,181,182}. Norms of behaviour are set within social identities, therefore understanding social identities can prove useful for predicting individual behaviour^{183,184}.

Belonging to a group is a source of self-esteem and distinctiveness¹⁸⁵. How and why people identify with different social identities strongly depends on two key characteristics: the group's status and people's similarity to its members¹⁸⁶⁻¹⁸⁸. Therefore, the higher the status of a group in society, the more people want to identify with it and vice versa¹⁸⁹⁻¹⁹¹. Similarity can be based on many characteristics, such as objective characteristics of nationality, skin colour or religion, but also on shared values and interests^{177,192,193}.

The identification with a group can be an advantage for working together but can also be to the exclusion of others, as seen in many political conflicts of our time. The identification with one group often leads to a reduced willingness to interact and share with others and to perceive others as less positive^{194,195}. Social identities can instil a sense of belonging that underpins the willingness to cooperate with others in our group. It can therefore be a force for good, if the focus is not on competition with an out-group or the competition is channelled into pro-social activities such as donations¹⁹⁶⁻¹⁹⁸.

One way to harness the positive effect of social identities without the negative by-product of out-group biases is through highlighting a common identity (e.g. all are 'European') or perhaps more successfully, dual identities (e.g. 'German-European', 'Irish-American', etc.). This dual identity approach allows people to be distinct and at the same time belong¹⁹⁹⁻²⁰¹. Intergroup contact when sharing the same goal, equal

status, cooperative environment and support from authorities is able to build these kind of identities^{202–205}.

In sum, social identity is important for policymaking because it is natural for people to distinguish themselves from others along multiple identity lines, and because the delineations can have positive effects towards the in-group and negative effects towards the out-group. Identities can be based on commonly shared traits and characteristics but also on the underlying values of a group, so the next key question is how values and identities relate to each other.

“ Personal identity answers the question ‘Who am I?’ Social identity responds to the question of ‘What am I?’ ”

KEY FINDINGS

- There are two important components of identity: personal and social identity.
- Personal identity is based on a person’s values, experiences and knowledge, and is mostly perceived to be unique.
- Social identity is about the groups or social categories one belongs to.
- A common misconception is that social and personal identities are one and the same, when in fact social identification can shift a person’s behaviour to align with the group by ascribing characteristics, values and qualities of the group to the self, depersonalising their personal identity.
- The relevance of personal identity for policymaking comes from the argument that values are at its core, therefore when one’s values are threatened it is also true that the sense of self is threatened.
- Social identification relies on two main factors: categorisation and identification.
- The identification with a group can be an advantage for working together but can also be to the exclusion of others, as seen in many political conflicts of our time.
- The identification with one group often leads to a reduced willingness to interact and share with others and to perceive others as less positive.
- One way to harness the positive effect of social identities without the negative by-product of out-group biases is through highlighting a common identity or perhaps more successfully, dual identities.

■ 2.4.2. Relationship between values and identities

This report seeks to understand the relationship between values and identities, an understudied area of complex interdisciplinary science. It is possible to differentiate between at least two ways that values determine:

- how important social identities are to people; and
- which values play an important role for specific social identities.

How much and with whom citizens identify reflects their priority given to certain values in several ways:

- personal values themselves can influence citizens' underlying tendencies for the need to belong;
- people identify with groups when they share goals and values with other members, or the group value itself.

To illustrate, people who strongly value Openness to change generally value group attachment less, because they want to make their own decisions^{206,207}. In contrast, people who value Conservation highly think of themselves more in terms of groups rather than as individuals²⁰⁸. This in-group focus can also be measured by the willingness to share money with individuals one feels close to, relative to strangers, which is considered a strong predictor of political behaviours^{209,210}. In Moral Foundations Theory, in-group loyalty is a specific part of the binding foundation that highly correlates with Conservation¹¹⁴. One study shows that individuals feel less attachment to the nation when the value of Openness to change (which opposes Conservation) is made more accessible^{206,207}. In the USA, these results do not extend to a difference in party loyalty^{211,212}.

In contrast, on the other main values axis, people valuing Self-enhancement focus on getting ahead as an individual or group, if necessary at a cost to others. One study shows that when

Self-enhancement values are made salient, the social status of a group becomes more important for someone to identify with it²¹³⁻²¹⁵. On the opposite side, Self-transcendence emphasises equality and tolerance, extending the in-group to other members of society, particularly the vulnerable²¹⁶.

Secondly, people also identify with groups they share goals and values with. Even if a person obtains group membership by birth (e.g. ethnicity, gender, region) they may still leave the group or do not actively identify with it if they do not share its values^{182,217}. In other words, shared values and goals are fundamental for people to sustain their belonging to a group, particularly for political parties. At the extreme, social identities can even be based on single values, so called 'value identities' such as an environmentalism, which connects them to a group sharing that value²¹⁸.

“ Personal values themselves can influence citizens' underlying tendencies for the need to belong.”

■ CASE STUDY: MASKS AS A SIGN OF SOCIAL IDENTITY IN COVID-19 TIMES

A tale of pandemic protection getting entangled with gender and political identity

When new norms are suddenly established – such as in the case of the COVID-19 global pandemic – such circumstances present an opportunity to re-affirm identities either through adherence to or deviance from the norm^{219–221}.

The link between masculine toughness, affective reactions to mask wearing and affirmation of political affiliation

In the USA, several studies find that men, white people and those with a strong Republican or Conservative political identity (not equivalent with Conservation values) are less likely to wear a face mask or engage in other protective behaviours than other groups^{222–228}. This finding seems to be driven by a subset of men, who emphasise their gender identity and consider themselves completely masculine²²⁴, endorse toughness as part of masculine norms²²⁵, or strongly conform to masculine norms²²⁹. This indicates that those men, who adhere to traditionally masculine gender norms, e.g. self-reliance, willingness to take risks, find it particularly inconsistent with their identity to wear face masks as a mitigation strategy against COVID-19.

Additionally, mask-wearing has become a signal of political identity²²⁷ with Conservatives and Republicans who often believe that masks are ineffective and signal this assertion by choosing not to wear one. The polarisation around mask wearing goes so far that Conservatives have indicated they would feel more comfortable around someone during a pandemic who is not wearing a face mask, with a stronger effect if the person is of Asian descent²²⁸.

What it means for policymaking and communication

Neville et al. (2021) suggest clearly defined target groups for recipients of protective COVID-19 actions messages that reaffirm identity. Optimally, the messenger should also be an in-group member, e.g. community leaders or religious authority figures (in the USA)²³⁰. Additionally, because traditional identity markers such as class, religion and gender are irrelevant to the virus transmission, new viral identities (e.g. 'Rebels', 'Warriors', 'Hoarders') are being created, which could be targeted²²¹.

Dennis et al. (2021) found that when matched to appeal to identity, public service announcements for mask-wearing were more effective than neutral messaging. They used Christian identity and economically motivated identity in their experiment. The effect of the Christian matched message ('We have a Christian duty to love our neighbours, and wearing a mask whenever you are in public and see other people is a way you can do this') nearly doubled that of the economically motivated one in terms of success. Importantly, the identity-matched messages had a negative effect, when matched with the 'wrong' identity, suggesting that identity neutral messaging is more effective when members of a certain identity group cannot be accurately targeted²³¹.



Man protesting against the new 'corona pass'. The Hague, Netherlands, September 25, 2021.

Values are also an important element in inter-group identity conflicts^{195,232}. Despite the usually low variation in values between groups, value differences are more important than, for example, race in determining conflict²³³. These differences between values may not even be real in some cases, because differences with other groups are often exaggerated to misrepresent an intergroup conflict as justified^{233,234}.

People often strive to uphold a positive and distinct social identity and compare their group with others searching for a positive distinction¹⁹⁴. Furthermore, because values are an integral part of group identities, if citizens see themselves excluded or antagonised by society as a whole, they can also try to identify themselves with groups which reject the prevailing values of society and actively seek other values for the same reason^{235–237}. As a result of this interaction between values, social identities and the perceived differences between groups, it is important to understand both together for effective policymaking.

Consequently, policymakers face the difficult task of disentangling the motivations behind the attitudes and behaviours of people to find an appropriate policy response. The distinction is, however, relevant because in the extreme, when conflicts are based on social identities, the goal is to win, even if it costs one or both sides^{211,238}. When the conflict centres instead on values, the goal is about how to satisfy the needs and motivations behind those values, then compromise is more likely. In reality, conflicts usually involve both at the same time, but to different degrees for different people. Therefore, policymakers should aim to reduce identity conflicts by allowing values to be expressed, listening to them and taking them into account.

Social identities can form around values but also come with specific norms of behaviour that differ from group to group. Identities are also always multiple, but the degree of perceived complexity in identities varies between people, which has

“When conflicts are based on social identities, the goal is to win, even if it costs one or both sides. When the conflict centres instead on values, the goal is about how to satisfy the needs and motivations behind those values, then compromise is more likely.”

repercussions for how much understanding people have for out-groups. The important question is therefore: what are important identities in Europe and how do they interact with the political process in general?

KEY FINDINGS

- How much and with whom citizens identify reflects their priority given to certain values.
- People also identify with groups when they share goals and values with other members as part of social categorisation.
- Shared values and goals are fundamental for people to sustain their belonging to a group, particularly for political parties.
- As values are an integral part of group identities, if citizens see themselves excluded or antagonised by society as a whole, they can also try to identify themselves with groups that reject the prevailing values of society and actively seek other values for the same reason.
- When conflicts are based on social identities, the goal is to win, even if it costs one or both sides.
- When the conflict centres on values, the goal is about how to satisfy the needs and motivations behind those values and compromise is more likely.



Multiple identity layers: Man wearing Scottish national dress and displaying various tattoos, clothing.



Protesters topple a statue of the slave trader Edward Colston and pushed the figure into the River Avon. Bristol, United Kingdom, June 2020.

IDENTITY POLITICS, POLARISATION AND VALUES DIVERSITY

■ 3.1. Social identities in politics

Each society has multiple culture-specific and cross-cultural groups and identities that citizens find important. For policymakers, the number of potential identity types may seem endless, creating possible hurdles when attempting to understand relevant issues for political decision-making. This chapter addresses some of the most important identities relevant to policymakers without the intent to be all encompassing. It then addresses polarisation in an attempt to explain an often misunderstood, complex phenomenon. Finally, the role of values diversity is discussed.

A recent review of social identities in the political process proposes the following categories of group identities²³⁹:

- **Local identity:** based on locality, such as regional, national, European, or eastern, western, northern and southern;
- **Sectoral identity:** based on a professional function in a department championing a particular policy view, such as ‘custodian’ in the health department or a ‘steward’ in the environmental department;
- **Organisational identity:** based on how interests are organised, such as belonging to a party (partisanship) or membership in an interest-specific association;
- **Demographic/biographic identities:** such as age, gender, language, ethnicity or religion;
- **Informal identities:** developed around specific issues or events, usually not visible.

People have multiple identities but only a few of them are relevant to an individual at any one time.

People have multiple identities but only a few of them are relevant to an individual at any one time. This relevance depends on^{240,241}:

- the status of the group;
- the similarity with other group members, for example a shared history, frequency of contact; and
- situational cues, where politicians and the media may make certain groups more relevant to a policy issue.

Viewing each of these specific identities through the angles described in the preceding chapter will allow the policymaker to navigate social identities more effectively and apply the insights to other types of identities as well. The policymaker should consider:

- in-group favouritism;
- out-group bias;
- characteristics and norms of the specific group; and
- potential ways to overcoming group boundaries.

Therefore, each of the identity types listed above is particularly relevant for policymakers in finding potential group views in stakeholders on policies beyond the evidence and values perspective. Furthermore, for each identity type it is important for a policymaker to be aware of the potential out-group biases and the need to overcome them in integrating different perspectives into effective policymaking. For the EU, identities based on locality are especially relevant, as are sectoral identities.

Specific identities become particularly relevant when they are perceived to be threatened. This can be:

- based on material reasons^{40,48,242};
- when there are threats to norms and values of the group^{49,79}; and
- when there is the threat of becoming a minority^{243,244}.

Such perceived circumstances lead to more group cohesiveness, stronger out-group biases and less willingness to incorporate new information. Avoiding threats to identities on material and normative grounds are therefore important ways to avoid or reduce potential conflicts for policymakers.

Additionally, citizens' perspectives take a special place in this report. While social class has become less important in recent times, national, European, partisan and identity concerns around populism are relevant identities affecting EU policymaking from the perspective of the general public, as supported by empirical evidence from the dedicated Eurobarometer in the following chapter.

KEY FINDINGS

- Local, Sectoral, Organisational, Demographic/ Biographic and Informal identities are useful categories to distinguish relevant identities in policymaking.
- Social identities become particularly relevant to people depending on their status, similarity to the group and the situation, where politicians and the media may make certain groups more relevant to a policy issue.
- Specific identities become particularly relevant when they are perceived to be threatened based on material reasons, threats to norms and values of the group and the threat of becoming a minority.

3.2. The prominence of partisan identity

Of all the social identities, from a societal perspective partisanship is particularly relevant as it has the capacity to subsume other social identities, such as left-right, national, ethnic, European and populist identities²³⁸. In this report, it is defined as the strong subjective identification with a political party, irrespective of party membership.

Partisanship has only recently been identified as a specific type of social identity but is one of the most prominent identities for policymakers due to its powerful influence on political behaviour²⁴⁵. Partisan identity has become very strong in the USA, to the degree that it has subsumed many other identities such as ethnic and religious identities²¹¹. Even in Europe, where party competition frequently involves more than two salient parties, partisanship seems to be functioning in the same way²⁴⁶. Partisans are the most involved in politics and are therefore important for democratic citizen involvement in politics in general.

Political parties reflect people's political orientation based on ideologies, values and world views. Identification with a political party is a voluntary and self-selected process, meaning that people are attracted to parties that align with their own personal political views, but it is also based on their social environment, where they live and who they interact with²⁴⁷. Once identified with a political party, partisans are motivated to protect and advance their party's status and electoral dominance as a means to maintain their party's positive distinctiveness^{90,193}. Partisan identity is extremely important for politics and policymaking because citizens identifying strongly with parties will sometimes adopt specific attitudes towards policies based on the party stance alone, rather than their own attitudes or values^{248,249}. This phenomenon is sometimes called identity fusion where individuals are also highly motivated to take action on behalf of their most important group²⁵⁰.

Strong partisans also display a greater level of in-group bias and willingness to actively take part in defending and increasing the status of their in-group, in the hope of supporting potential electoral victories – even at the expense of democratic principles⁸². For example, in the USA a greater number of American partisans are interested in politics to win an election by any means necessary rather than to pursue a policy or ideological goal²⁵¹. Partisans display strong defensive emotions around threats to their party²⁴⁶. Partisan identities influence reasoning on political cognition, including beliefs about political figures, political facts, support for policies, scientific issues, social issues and beliefs in the expertise of scientists (myside bias)^{252–257}. Consequently, the influence of partisan identities can threaten the democratic process, which requires and assumes that citizens have access to reliable knowledge, allowing them to participate in public debate and make informed choices.

Partisanship is based on the parties that people support, and parties in democratic systems can bundle many different political issues into their

manifesto positions. As parties signal these positions to citizens holding a variety of social identities, partisanship can aggregate many of the previously mentioned identity dimensions and values²⁵⁸. It also becomes more important to citizens under heightened political salience and polarisation^{87,259}. The main difference between the USA and Europe is that overall, there are lower levels of partisanship, with significant variations between countries, but there is no difference in the effect of partisanship on attitudes and behaviour²⁴⁶.

Parties and political movements can resort to Identity politics instead of focusing purely on specific policies. Identity politics can be defined as the view of politics through one or more particular group lenses, where the interests are focused around that identity²⁶⁰. Identity politics can involve many different identities, because every characteristic can become the source of an identity and therefore of in-group cohesion and out-group bias. The economic left-right conflict revolved around economic class identities, whereas with the new cultural political conflict, identities such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation and the 'virtuous population' against the elite (populism) have become more important³⁵.

“ Partisan identities influence reasoning on political cognition, including beliefs about political figures, political facts, support for policies, scientific issues, social issues and beliefs in the expertise of scientists.”

NATIONAL IDENTITY

Relevance to policymaking: One of the most pertinent social identities.

Public perception: To an overwhelming majority of people, the concept of a nation-state is both 'normal' and 'natural'.

Attributes: National identity *can* encourage solidarity amongst citizens and lead individuals to sacrifice personal gain for the common good²⁶¹.

National identity *can* feel exclusive and delineate the in- and out-group. Even for the most cosmopolitan member of a nation, there is 'us' and 'them', the foreigners that are not part of their nation, a notion that is inherent in the nationalist doctrine itself^{22,193,262,263}.

Characteristics: Collective identities are stronger when they develop out of a long historical process that is imprinted into collective memories and brought to attention through reminders such as symbols, flags, writings, monuments, celebratory holidays, and unique myths and stories^{264,265}.

Identity conflicts: When distinctiveness and superiority to others, referred to as nationalism with respect to culture, ethnicity and competition, are emphasised or become salient, national identity conflicts with other identities²⁶⁶⁻²⁶⁸. In contrast, patriotism, as in pride in a country's achievements and civic political environment, can be identity inclusive^{52,267}.

EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Relevance to policymaking: European identity drives attitudes towards particular EU policies and EU membership²⁶⁹⁻²⁷¹ and, in return, gains support for the EU positively affecting European identity.

Public perception: EU support, measured as perceiving membership in the EU as good or neutral, increases European identity significantly²⁷².

Attributes: Those who identify with European integration as a political project, do so regardless of whether or not they feel a sense of community.

Identification relies on the perspective of the narrative for joining a community. If equating the European identity with the EU, then the reasons why a country joined the EU will persist to influence the citizens' view towards it^{47,273}.

Characteristics: This is a relatively new identity in its current form, which can be understood in many different ways. It is often equated with an EU identity, but is conceptually distinct and people can identify with it for multiple reasons. It can be broken down into at least 2 separate sub-dimensions: cultural (shared perception of European heritage) and civic (identification with the political system) European identity^{274,275}.

Identity conflicts: European identity predicts support for the EU in decisions such as Brexit 47, but can also be the foundation for out-group biases in the cultural identity perspective²⁷⁶.

POPULIST IDENTITY

Relevance to policymaking: A key narrative of populism is that society can be divided into a 'virtuous people' and a 'corrupt elite'⁴⁸. Populism can be both economically and socially left-wing or right-wing, although it seems that in Europe right-wing populism is currently stronger than left-wing populism³⁷.

Public perception: Citizens do not hold a 'populist identity', rather the identity is defined by the out-group⁴⁰, therefore framing populism is dependent upon the perceived out-group (which can be multiple).

Attributes: The specific form of right-wing populism blends authoritarianism values and populism together³⁵, which adds a specific link to the values of Security, Conformity, Tradition and in-group loyalty.

Characteristics: Essential criteria and norms of behaviour often attached to populism are that they are anti-elite, be it establishment parties, scientists, technocrats, judges or journalists²⁷⁷. Being anti-establishment in this sense can mean that one can be proud to be wrong, because it is a signal to belong to the masses⁴⁸.

Identity conflicts: It is anti-pluralist, because everyone is the same as a part of the masses, which means that institutions for pluralist views such as parliaments are not needed.



Table 5: Different ways to frame populist conflicts

Three ways populists frame 'us vs them' conflict			
	Cultural populism	Socio-economic populism	Anti-establishment populism
The people	'Native' members of the nation-state	Hard-working, honest members of the working class (potentially transcending national boundaries)	Hard-working, honest victims of a state run by special interest groups
The others	Non-natives, criminals, ethnic and religious minorities, cosmopolitans, elites	Big business, capital owners, foreign or 'imperial' forces that prop up an international capitalist system	Political elites who represent their own interests
Key themes	Emphasis on religious traditionalism, law and order, national sovereignty, migrants as enemies	Anti-capitalism, working-class, solidarity, foreign business interests as enemies, often joined with anti-Americanism	Purging the state from corruption, reform of legal systems, challenging supra-national institutions and the rules-based international order

Source: Kyle & Gultchin (2018).²⁷⁸

In summary, some identities such as national identity and European identity (see boxes) can be both exclusive and inclusive, depending on whether they are based on the civic nature of valuing political institutions or have an in-group and culturally-based superiority perception. Therefore not all identification with a group is necessarily bad, but policymakers need to carefully examine which basis it comes from. Policymakers can encourage positive patriotism or pride that is inclusive by, for example, encouraging dual-identities. In contrast, partisanship is exclusionary to all out-group parties, but positive for the high political involvement of citizens, which is the lifeblood of a democracy. Finally, as regards populism, it depends on whether someone is part of the populace or elite, which often reflects more the satisfaction with the system rather than a specific historic or cultural identity.

Relative importance of identities in Europe

Social identities are relevant to the self-concept and self-esteem of citizens. People protect their identity when threatened and there are many ways in which these identities can be threatened, resulting in increased tribalism and out-group discrimination⁶⁷.

It is therefore highly relevant for policymakers to take identities into account in their decision-making processes, and it is important to note those identities considered particularly significant to European citizens, e.g. by avoiding to directly threaten them.


Measuring identities is not easy, especially for potentially non-existent identities such as partisanship for non-voters or identities that define themselves through the opposition, for example, populist identities relative to corrupt elites. A general tendency for identification should be measurable, but identities can also be made salient based on different frames and cues, so policymakers should always keep framings and situational cues in mind.

Figure 14 from the dedicated Eurobarometer illustrates those identities that are seen as most important in the EU at this time. Family is the most important identity, followed by Nationality. Religion and Political Beliefs seem to be relatively less important, but differences are not extremely large. The numbers indicate that many citizens identify with many of these categories at the

same time, and few do not identify at all with some categories.

In general, the results show the enduring and central importance of national identity in the EU political context. Given that national identity can be both positive and negative depending on whether it reflects nationalism or patriotism does not have to be a reason for concern for the future of the EU. The majority of people also identify with being European, ahead of their identification with both political beliefs and religion. Overall, the list may help identify the order of relevant identities when communicating and addressing policy options relating to different areas of concern. As a first step, EU policymakers could consider the potential impact on and reaction to their policies from the many dimensions of central identities, such as family and national identity.

Figure 14: Identification with different groups in the EU.



On a scale from 0 "Not at all" to 10 "A lot". Answers from 0-3 are summarized as "Do not identify", 4-6 as "Neither identify, nor not identify" and 7-10 as "Identify"

Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020.

Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

KEY FINDINGS

- Each society has multiple culture-specific and cross-cultural groups and identities which citizens find important.
- Local (e.g. nationality), Sectoral (e.g. health ministry), Organisational (e.g. political party), Demographic/Biographic (e.g. gender) and Informal identities (e.g. around specific events) are important categories to help map social identities in the political decision-making process.
- People have multiple identities but only a few of them are relevant to an individual at any one time. This relevance depends on the social status of the group, the similarity with other group members and the situation, for example where politicians and the media can make certain groups more relevant to a policy issue.
- Of all the social identities, partisanship is particularly relevant as it has the capacity to subsume other social identities, such as left-right, national, ethnic, European and populist identities.
- Partisans are the most involved in politics and are therefore important for democratic citizen involvement in politics in general.
- National identity and European identity can be both inclusive and exclusive. The extent of inclusiveness depends on whether these identities are based on the civic nature of valuing political institutions rather than in-group cultural superiority.
- Avoiding threats to identities on material and normative grounds are therefore important ways to avoid or reduce potential conflicts.
- Social identities are relevant to the self-concept and self-esteem of citizens.
- People protect their identity when threatened. There are many ways in which these identities can be threatened and result in increased tribalism and out-group discrimination.
- It is highly relevant for policymakers to take identities into account in their decision-making processes. It is also important to note those identities considered particularly significant to European citizens, for example by avoiding actions that could be perceived as threatening towards them.
- According to the Eurobarometer results, Family is the most important identity, followed by Nationality, while Religion and Political Beliefs seem to be relatively less important, but differences are not very large.



■ 3.3. Diversity in values and identities and the link to polarisation


■ 3.3.1. How diverse are the values within EU societies?

Despite some slow value change at the generational level, values diversity will always exist and is usually greater within a country than between countries. This means that every democracy needs to constantly engage with a diversity of values. When one speaks about cultural differences between different countries or continents²⁷⁹⁻²⁸¹, it means that they differ in their dominant values but also in the prominence of social identities. While people may instinctively want to compare their country's average values scores, a study comparing values from 67 countries in the World Value Survey from different

continents finds that country differences only explain between 2-22% of the total variation, depending on the values measured¹⁷. Different countries may also vary in their distributions on specific values, i.e. have more consensus, fragmentation or polarisation towards extreme positions, which are blurred in between-country average comparisons.

This higher values diversity within rather than between countries is determined by factors including personal characteristics and experiences, instead of by the country and its culture²⁸². While examining if Europe can be divided into distinct values clusters^{281,283}, experts²⁸² have cautioned against thinking of European 'cultural zones' or 'civilisations' as units of comparison and analysis²⁷. Values diversity is even argued to be a feature of society rather than a flaw

Figure 15: Between-country comparison of Openness to change v Conservation in the EU.




Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020. Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

because it allows societies to respond to multiple threats and opportunities²⁸⁴. There is no single factor that would explain a formation of distinct cultural zones within Europe (e.g. based on religion, language, political tradition, historical pathways, socio-economic development, etc.). This means that even if there are some differences within the continent, they cannot be attributed to one factor causing a clear split. Stereotyping parts of Europe by, for example, East-West, North-South, Club-Med, Central Europe, Orthodox/Catholic/Protestant is therefore of little meaning in either values or policy terms.

Data from the dedicated Eurobarometer corroborates that, for the most part, there is more values diversity within Member States than between them. Looking at the axis Openness

“ The EU slogan ‘United in diversity’ can be understood mostly through the lens of values diversity within Member States and less so between them.”

Figure 16: Between country comparison of Self-enhancement v Self-transcendence in the EU.



Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020. Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

to change v Conservation, which represents a potential values conflict, Figure 15 illustrates that there is little difference in the values distribution between the Member States but much within.


A similar conclusion can be drawn for the other potential values conflict, as Figure 16 illustrates for Self-enhancement v Self-transcendence. There is one notable difference between the 2 graphs. While there is very little variation in distribution in Figure 15, in comparison, Figure 16 shows a few countries that gravitate less towards Self-transcendence values, but the overall variation is also higher in those countries.

Consequently, the EU slogan ‘United in diversity’ in this sense can be understood mostly through the lens of values diversity within Member States and less so between them.

However a similar values distribution in all the Member States does not mean that people are not divided or polarised. The Eurobarometer data (see Figure 17) shows that citizens with a strong political identity show more extreme values, depending on their political orientation.

For example, the top left quadrant of Figure 17 shows that when people self-identify ideologically as extremely left wing and identify strongly

Figure 17: Positions of values depending on political orientation and identification in the EU.



Source: Special Eurobarometer 508 on Values and Identities of EU citizens, wave 94.1, 2020. Available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2230>; doi: 10.2760/206143.

with their political beliefs, they value much more Openness to change than people who also identify strongly politically, but with a right-wing orientation.

Conversely, the top right quadrant shows that people who self-identify as extremely right wing with a strong political identity value Conservation more than people with strong political identity on the left. This pattern applies to Self-transcendence as well. Self-enhancement is the only higher order value of the personal values for which this pattern does not hold. People on both sides of the political spectrum are higher in Self-enhancement when they have a strong political identity. This is consistent with the idea that people who are

“The people most likely to be active in politics are the ones who most differ in their orientations of values, while those who are less political are rather similar.”

APPROACHING VALUE-LADEN CONFLICTS – THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE

Plurality of values makes value-based trade-offs inevitable. It is important to first understand the underlying values, of which some have an oppositional character and cannot be pursued at the same time. Policymakers need to take different priorities of values into account at every stage of the policy cycle. In contrast to seeking a broader values base for developing policies, in a direct conflict situation, values should not be raised if a solution is sought. When particular value conflicts between involved groups arise, negotiation and mediation can be ways of constructively moving forward.

Conflicts around values involve identity threat and visceral responses¹⁷⁶. Given how closely tied values and identities can be, value conflicts can also evolve into narratives about stereotypes²⁸⁵. In conflicts about people's core concerns, many standard negotiation techniques fail. Some alternative approaches have proven useful for achieving better outcomes in such conflicts, which include:^{285,286}

- the other-affirmation technique by recalling positive characteristics about the other person;
- emphasising interests instead of values; or
- framing an outcome as a win-win agreement.

However, in deep value conflicts, outcomes such as compromises, trade-offs and other classic forms of conflict resolution are often considered unacceptable. In short, in a deep conflict, values should not be raised if a resolution is sought. Instead, for example, focusing on interests has been shown to decrease people's feelings of self-involvement and increase perceptions of common ground²⁸⁷. Tackling interests can indirectly address values from different perspectives. Nevertheless, understanding which values motivate people in conflicts and beyond is essential for policymakers to avoid producing many of the conflicts between values in the first place.



Left and right self-placement are often used to measure issue polarisation.

convinced of their political opinion probably also want to tell people what to do (Power dominance) because they are convinced of their position.

People who identify strongly with their political orientation are more polarised on values consistent with their political orientation on the left-right spectrum. It therefore follows that the people most likely to be active in politics are the ones who most differ in their orientations of values, while those who are less political are rather similar. This needs

to be taken into account in seeking compromises in conflicts between values. When it comes to tackling polarisation, these findings demonstrate the need and the importance to take both values and identity concerns into account as they cannot be neatly separated.

■ 3.3.2. Evidence on polarisation in Europe

A diversity of values and identities in societies is to be expected and welcomed, but if taken to extremes it can undermine democratic debates and processes. Such processes therefore need to be sufficiently robust to allow the expression of values diversity to ensure that polarisation does not threaten democracy itself.

Political polarisation represents an extreme form of disagreement, but it is important to distinguish between two types of polarisation:

- **Issue, attitude or ideological polarisation**²⁸⁸:
 - Refers to differences in policy preferences and attitudes to concrete policy decisions – the substance of policy and political decisions;
- **Affective or social polarisation**^{238,289,290}:
 - Captures how much people dislike other groups in the political context and how distant from them they feel in terms of commonality and liking;
 - If a society is highly affectively polarised, this means the different groups see themselves as opposed, maybe even as enemies, which have little in common except for mutual resentment;
 - The groups in question are often other party supporters, hinging on partisanship, but may also include feelings towards other groups based on nationality, ethnicity or being perceived as part of a corrupt elite.

The interrelations between both types of polarisation do not show a clear, predictable pattern, which means that strong issue polarisation does not require strong affective polarisation and vice versa^{86,88,291,292}. People can still hate each other and be affectively divided even if their positions on certain policy issues are similar²¹¹, or they can have more in common than one would assume judging by their level of affective polarisation²⁹³.

Research on polarisation is dominated by a focus on the USA, whereas insights for Europe are sparse, and suffer from a lack of data

availability for some countries. It is also more difficult to study affective polarisation in a multi-party context, which is a subject of considerable academic debate.

Polarisation trends in Europe:

- Issue polarisation – seems to be in decline or be stable^{294–298};
- Affective polarisation – similar levels to the USA can be found in Europe^{84–89,299}.

The landscape on affective polarisation varies within Europe: southern and central eastern Europe are highly polarised, reaching similar or higher levels than the USA^{85–89,289}. However, when measured as the likelihood of never wanting to vote for a party, countries from northern and western Europe (Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands) feature high on the list of affective polarisation as well, showing a possibility for political disruption of new parties activating this potential²⁹⁹.

While the map of highly polarised countries in Europe varies depending on specific measurements, in almost all of the measurements the USA was rather average. Therefore the dangerous effects of polarisation on democracy should also be a concern for European policymakers.

There are, however, two caveats to these patterns. One is that polarisation, particularly on issues, has not been systematically studied across Europe, so the picture for many countries is not clear. The other relates to time and research focus: most of the studies on affective polarisation have been conducted during the last decade, but no longer on issue polarisation. It is therefore difficult to say if only affective polarisation is high today, or whether the same applies to issue polarisation as well.

Even if societies as a whole are not polarised, the perception that they are, in itself, is also important and potentially impactful. Even if inaccurate, misperceptions about polarisation

and a sense of insurmountable political differences can also lead to negative consequences for democracy. The good news is that correcting wrong perceptions about the degree of dislike that other people display towards your own group can decrease affective polarisation³⁰⁰.

Polarised societies can have reduced trust in their government⁷⁷ and be more vulnerable to the negative effects of authoritarian predispositions. It can also increase the sense of threat to shared norms and values, which in turn increases the risks of intolerance among populations (based on US research⁷⁹). When polarisation is affective and based on identity concerns rather than issues, it can lead voters to care more about party loyalty and winning than about democratic principles. This can lead to the application of double standards when judging questionable behaviour of elected officials, making citizens largely ineffective to hold the undemocratic behaviour of politicians to account^{82,83,238}.

Disentangling affective polarisation from issue polarisation may be difficult, but the challenges presented by both are different in nature. When citizens disagree on issues derived from values, policymakers need to take them into account when designing policies, because they more legitimately reflect peoples' preferences, wishes and needs (see tools in the next chapter). By contrast, to address affective polarisation policymakers need to develop policies and behaviours that reduce dislike, misperceptions and safeguard democratic institutions³⁰¹.

Potential causes of polarisation

Economic conditions can fuel both affective and issue polarisation. Loss of societal status and recognition contribute to political discontent²³⁶. In the USA, party ideological polarisation strongly correlates with economic inequality³⁰². According to a 20-country study, unemployment and income inequality also contribute to the intensification of affective polarisation, with high levels of affective polarisation in countries hit hard

“ Even if societies as a whole are not polarised, the perception that they are, in itself, is also important and potentially impactful.”



Man wearing a cap referencing QAnon slogan at Donald Trump campaign rally. Butler, U.S., October 31, 2020.

by the 2008 financial crisis (Greece, Portugal and Spain in particular)⁸⁵.

Media and social media also play a special role in polarisation. Modern social media infrastructure coupled with myside bias may drive perceptions and salience of affective polarisation³⁰³. Social media create conditions for polarising content to gain traction – the loudest, moralised, emotional and most extreme voices are the most heard, increasing the benefits of partisan cues and dislike of other groups^{304–307}.

Social media can also increase an individual's issue polarisation but there is not enough evidence to say social media causes large-scale societal polarisation in general^{308,309}. It is therefore hard to disentangle legitimate concerns based on values from identity conflicts on social media, which may spill back into traditional media through feedback loops. For a detailed analysis of the influence of social media on democracy, please refer to the JRC report *Technology and Democracy: Understanding the influence of online technologies on political behaviour and decision-making*, part of the Enlightenment 2.0 series.

Finally, large-scale changes in society should not be ignored. There is evidence that political identities are becoming more important in everyday life, at least in Europe and the USA^{246,310}. This means that political conflicts are also becoming more important, which can contribute to increased polarisation. The evidence from the Eurobarometer indicates that political orientation is already slightly more important than religious beliefs in the EU, yet not as important as many other identities. At the same time, the perceived rapid value change, even if slow in absolute terms, may also lead to more polarisation. Countries which undergo a faster value change seem to polarise more²⁹⁴. For Europe, this may explain differences between countries in conflict over certain values and serve as a warning against ignoring unique historical trajectories³¹¹.

KEY FINDINGS

- Values diversity will always exist and is usually stronger within a country than between countries. This finding is generally corroborated by the Eurobarometer data.
- People who identify strongly with their political orientation polarise more strongly on values consistent with their political orientation on the left-right spectrum.
- It therefore follows that the people most likely to be active in politics are the ones who most differ in their orientations of values, while those who are less political are rather similar.
- When it comes to polarisation, there is a need to take both values and identity concerns into account as they cannot be separated.
- In contrast to seeking a broader values base for developing policies, in a direct conflict situation, values should not be raised if a solution is sought. Focusing on interests has been shown to decrease people's feelings of self-involvement and increase perceptions of common ground. Tackling interests can indirectly address values from different perspectives.
- Political polarisation represents an extreme form of disagreement.
- There are two types of polarisation: issue, attitude or ideological polarisation and affective or social polarisation.
- Issue polarisation refers to differences in policy preferences and attitudes to concrete policy decisions – the substance of policy and political decisions.
- Affective polarisation captures how much

people dislike other groups in the political context and how distant they feel from them in terms of commonality and liking.

- The interrelations between both types of polarisation do not show a clear, predictable pattern, which means that strong Issue polarisation does not require strong Affective polarisation and vice versa.
- In Europe, from the limited data available, Issue polarisation seems to be in decline or remain stable in Europe.
- In contrast, levels of Affective polarisation in Europe are similar to those in the USA. The landscape varies within Europe where southern and central eastern Europe are highly affectively polarised when it comes to politics, reaching similar or higher levels than the USA.
- Even if societies as a whole are not polarised, the perception that they are is in itself also important and potentially impactful.
- When polarisation is based on Affective polarisation and identity concerns rather than issues, it can lead voters to care more about

party loyalty and winning than about democratic principles.

- If citizens disagree on issues derived from values, policymakers can take these into account when designing policies, because they legitimately reflect peoples' preferences, wishes and needs. When addressing Affective polarisation by contrast, policymakers need to develop policies and behaviours that reduce dislike and misperceptions and safeguard democratic institutions.
- There is evidence that political identities are becoming more important in peoples' everyday lives. The evidence from the Eurobarometer indicates that political orientation is already slightly more important than religious beliefs in the EU, yet not as important as many other identities.
- For Europe, this may explain differences between countries in conflict over certain values and serve as a caution against ignoring unique historical trajectories.



Women demonstrating outside the Polish embassy in solidarity with protesters in Poland against a court ruling further limiting abortion. Rome, Italy, October 28, 2020.



Participant at Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) at a Citizens' panel. Strasbourg, France, October 3, 2021.

POLICYMAKING FIT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

■ 4.1. Policymaking under diversity

Managing values diversity or more precisely diversity in priorities over values and identity conflicts in democracies is not new. However, this will always be challenging and value conflicts can rarely be resolved to the satisfaction of all. Policymakers have to constantly work within this diversity. The evidence presented above shows that specifically values:

- are formed early in life and remain relatively stable thereafter;
- are drivers of attitudes, behaviour and even knowledge;
- are more diverse within societies than between them; and
- they also affect how much we feel attached to certain identities, which may lead to identity as well as conflicts between values.

There are processes within modern democracies designed to address the diversity of values and identities, be it through mechanisms such as free and fair elections or human rights and the rule of law, which protect and tolerate minority views. At its core, liberal democracy is about negotiating values and 'all policy making and governance, local and global, is about efforts to find shared guiding values, deliberate and come to a common ground'³¹². However, existing mechanisms may struggle to resolve disagreements over values about existential

Consciously integrating values into policymaking, policy advice and innovation means to always be prepared and capable to articulate, critically discuss and specify one's value perspective.'

(European Group on Ethics, 2021)

threats to society such as climate change, when coupled with polarisation and some who openly question and deconstruct liberal democracy. The danger of polarisation and threats to democracy require specific policy responses, some of which are covered in the previous chapters, while this chapter focuses instead on possible changes to the policymaking process.

“The idea is not to merge States to create a Super State. Our European States are a historical reality. From a psychological point of view it would be impossible to do away with them. Their diversity is a good thing and we do not intend to level them down or equalize them. [...] To our mind, European policy is certainly not in contradiction with the patriotic ideal. It encourages the particular nature and characteristics of each of its states and fosters the sound love for one’s own country which is a love that does not go in detriment of other countries. It wants to attain a unity in the fullness of its diversity.”

Robert Schuman, Pour l’Europe (1963)

Changing peoples’ values is slow, very difficult and ethically questionable¹⁵. Therefore the key to understanding any implication for policymaking is to accept values diversity and the inevitability of some repeated conflict and trade-offs in any policy. Biases such as the myside bias mentioned above, may inflate conflicts, but should definitely not be seen as the sole driver of disagreement and plurality in society. In contrast to economic cost-benefit analyses, there is no established metric for trade-offs between values and it is questionable if there ever will be^{6,117}. Some recent approaches from behavioural science try to derive ways to incorporate preferences that go beyond traditional economic ones, but they are far from universally accepted³¹³. If values are in opposition in a specific policy, successful resolution may not only focus on the outcome, but also on the way it was achieved. This means that the process of how citizens’ diverse values are taken into account is important beyond the final compromise³¹⁴.

To address some of these issues, this chapter focuses on the implications for policymakers, and policymaking. The insights are structured in a practical Toolbox providing hands-on methods from which policymakers can choose which tool best fits their needs and the situation.

■ 4.2. Integrating values and identities into policymaking

Policymakers in democracies share a common goal: they want their legislative proposals to be well designed and well received. This requires a good understanding of the science, politics

and citizens’ perspectives, including their values. In EU policymaking, the 2021 Communication on *Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws (COM(2021) 2019)* emphasised that ‘to sustain trust in the European Union, EU policies need to take into account and reflect the values and concerns of citizens’. Values and concerns about identity are relevant throughout the policy cycle, with a particular importance of upfront reflections as values being essential to the framing of the policy problem.

A systematic and in-depth reflection on the values and identities as part of the policymaking process would be ideal. However, it would be premature to apply them to all policies, given the still-emerging evidence on how to best include them. Therefore, this report presents initial concepts and ideas for the explicit inclusion of values and identities in practice. The intention is to further develop it through practice and rigorous testing, leading to a clearly defined set of tools that proportionately consider values and identities across the political decision-making process. In the EU, once tested, these tools could be considered part of the Better Regulation Toolbox, but these tools are not limited to EU policymaking. In the meantime, policymakers who want to better integrate values and identity-related issues into their work can explore these new tools.

As an overarching approach, a ‘Various Values View’ (VVV) that looks at a specific policy problem through different values lenses, could help improve policymaking. As values influence the importance of identities, the need for belonging or inclusiveness, incorporating these concerns into

a VVV approach is also important. Policymakers can employ methods to mitigate the impact of identity biases on their own and their group decision-making for example through ‘red teaming’, which sees a group within the team play the role of an adversary and provides feedback from an out-group perspective³¹⁵.

But policies do not have to simply resolve the underlying value conflicts in a zero-sum approach; sometimes it is possible to design policies that address several values – even opposing ones. For example, the European Green Deal proposes economic growth through environmentally sustainable behaviour, which attempts to address potentially conflicting values in a positive sum way³¹⁶. A better understanding of values and how they relate to various policies can help policymakers find optimal solutions to many policy issues³¹⁷.

Values can play a role at all stages of the policymaking process. In particular, values are relevant to understand a policy question or problem, frame the policy options, assess the impact of possible solutions, evaluate the outcome of an adopted measure and communicate better. Table 6 below outlines the possible use of different tools at different phases of the political decision-making process according to the objectives

of the policymaker. For each phase, there are corresponding tools that aim to:

1. provide novel insights into values and identity-related issues, enabling the policymaker to gain a heightened understanding of the issue;
2. increase understanding through participation in meaningful, co-created processes that explicitly address values diversity; and
3. increase the resonance of communication messages.

The three types of tools (Heighten understanding, Co-creation and Communication) outlined in Table 6 can be used individually or together for improving policymaking. They are intended to support and structure the otherwise intuitive thinking processes inherent to politics and policymaking. When appropriate, policy interventions could involve all stakeholders and citizens and investigate their values. However, some policy problems are more technical than others, placing barriers for involvement for most citizens. Furthermore, a direct involvement of all citizens is rarely feasible in democratic processes, which is why representatives are elected. In some way, some considerations of the fullest possible range of values are nevertheless needed for optimal policymaking.



“ The process of how citizens’ diverse values are taken into account is important beyond the final compromise.”

THE EU POLICYMAKING CYCLE

There are 4 key phases in the policymaking cycle that contribute to evidence-informed and transparent EU law-making based on the views of those that may be affected: Preparation, Adoption, Implementation and Application. Within each of these phases, there are a number of ways policymakers could incorporate a VVV approach:

- Better regulation starts with *good planning* – this phase covers the initial consideration of an initiative and the organisation of the supporting processes that include: the evaluation of policies already in place; the assessment of problems and alternative solutions; engagement with stakeholders and the preparation of initiatives.
- *Stakeholder consultation* – an essential element of policy preparation and review. Good policy development is built on openness. Stakeholder inputs provide feedback and evidence to support evaluations, impact assessments, the preparation of initiatives and political decisions. In EU policymaking, it is good practice to plan stakeholder consultations using a simple, concise consultation strategy that identifies and targets relevant stakeholders with a range of consultation activities in order to gather all relevant evidence comprising data/information and views.
- *Evaluation/fitness checks* – policy preparation is supported by both evaluations and impact assessments. Both look at how a problem is, or should be, addressed (and its underlying causes) to achieve the desired objectives, taking account of costs and benefits. Both are also based on an integrated approach that addresses impacts across the environmental, social and economic pillars of sustainable development.
- *Impact assessments* – collect evidence (including results from evaluations) to assess if future legislative or non-legislative EU action is justified and how such action can best be designed to achieve desired policy objectives. An impact

assessment must identify and describe the problem to be tackled, establish objectives, formulate policy options, assess the impacts of these options and describe how the expected results will be monitored.

- *Implementation support and monitoring* – the full benefits of an EU intervention will only be delivered if the policy is implemented and applied appropriately. This is why it is essential to take into account implementation and enforcement issues when designing an EU intervention, including the impact assessment process and associated stakeholder consultation. It is also important to identify ways to assist Member States in the transposition phase. Checks on transposition and assessments of compliance are also key tools used to monitor the correct application of EU legislation.
- *Quality control measures are embedded throughout these phases.*











Table 6: Tools for incorporating concerns about values and identities into policymaking.

Policy phase	Values / Identities related initiative(s)	Type of tool	Recommended approaches	
Preparation	<p>Actively seek to understand the plurality of citizens' values and perspectives at the beginning of a policy problem definition.</p> <p>When drafting the problem statement a VVV can help identify alternative perspectives of the topic, thus allowing policymakers to understand many major concerns already at this stage in the process.</p> <p>Fast-track values & identities assessment to determine the political salience of the issue. Depending upon the outcome, this will have ramifications throughout the policy cycle.</p>		<p>Fast-track assessment tool</p> <p>Include questions in polling/Eurobarometer</p> <p>Strategic foresight incorporating values</p> <p>Interactive workshop</p> 	
	In stakeholder consultations , being aware of the values positions the actors embrace and their identities, can help foster compromise , and identify positions that might be missing from the debate.	Heighten understanding	Different forms of citizen engagement to understand different frames	
	Evaluations must be coherent with the values embedded in the policy . As such, they need to take these values into account in the methodology that is applied for evaluation.	Co-creation Communication	Values text mining and media monitoring tool Fast-track assessment tool	
	Impact assessments and post-implementation evaluations do not merely estimate the outcomes of a given policy option, but they must also evaluate the different outcomes. A VVV may help getting an alternative perspective.		Interactive workshop	
	When drafting the actual policy , having understood the problem from several values perspectives can help addressing these concerns and thereby fitting the policy better to the citizens' needs.		Include questions in polling/Eurobarometer	
Implementation	In communication of a new policy initiative, a VVV can help framing in a way that is accepted by a large part of the public and anticipate arguments opposing the adoption of the policy.	Communication	Case study examples using framing with values 	
Application	In support of monitoring, evaluation and revision, policymakers can access a Values Text Mining and Media Monitoring Tool being developed by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre.	Communication	Values text mining and media monitoring tool 	

4.3. The Toolbox

Most tools proposed below are presented as inspirations for better integrating the various values and identities systematically into policymaking. With the exception of the Citizen Engagement approach in **Tool Type 2 – Co-creation**, all the tools are proposals to be further developed and tested. The JRC aims at doing so in the near future, but any organisation or person interested in engaging in this endeavour is invited to do so. Collaboration and co-creation of such tool development to uphold a pluralist liberal democracy is at the core of our mission.

All tools and contact details can be found under the JRC's dedicated website of the knowledge brokerage community: https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/evidence-informed-policy-making_en.



TOOL TYPE 1

Heightened understanding

Intended audience: Policymakers

Stage of the policy process: Preparatory

Aim: This tool includes a number of approaches to heighten the understanding of values and identities.

Purpose: This first step in the policy planning process defines the scope of the initiative and seeks the appropriate level of political validation to develop the idea further. In this phase it is highly recommended that values and identities related considerations are taken into account to ensure that no important perspectives on the problem are excluded.

Discover one's own values priorities and values blind spots.

Online surveys can help policymakers identify their own priorities of values before taking these into consideration in the political decision-making process. Ideally using the personal values approach, policymakers can reflect on their own values to better identify potential blind spots – certain values they may not intuitively or easily empathise with. Comparisons with the results presented in Chapter 2 of this report may also highlight differences between the individual policymaker and the broader views of EU citizens. Numerous surveys are available for free online. The JRC has a link to the most recent personal values survey on its website.

Fast-track Values Assessment.

Not all policy problems need to delve deeply into values. This rapid test will allow the policymaker to assess the extent to which the issue should be considered in terms of values (or morality politics).

The following presents a minimum set of questions³¹⁸ to be answered by the policymaker that help assess to what extent the issue is a values-laden policy or not. No survey or assessment will give a definite answer to this issue, but the following questions will serve as a first indication.

- Q1.** People sometimes change their support or opposition to policy proposals as they gain more information about the issue. How likely is it that having more information about these proposals will change your support or opposition of them? On a scale of 1-5 (1 = highly likely; 5 = highly unlikely).
- Q2.** How do you see these proposals in terms of your own system of core values. Is there something you believe to be fundamentally right or wrong? On a scale of 1-5 (1 = Does not support/oppose core values; 5 = supports/opposes core values)
- Q3.** Legislation often requires making compromises. Regardless of your support or opposition to an issue, how willing would you be to accept a 'middle ground' compromise with those who have different views from yours? On a scale of 1-5 (1 = very willing; 5 = very unwilling)
- Q4.** Regardless of whether you oppose or support the proposal, how important do you consider the issues it raises? On a scale of 1-5 (1 = very unimportant; 5 = very important).
- Q5.** How interested would you be in joining or supporting an organisation dedicated solely to this issue? On a scale of 1-5 (1 = highly uninterested; 5 = very interested).
- Q6.** Do you consider this issue to be primarily an economic issue or primarily a non-economic issue? On a scale of 1-5 (1 = non-economic issue; 5 = economic issue).

In general, a higher score to any of the questions will indicate a more values-laden policy issue. Aggregating these will give a good overview of the overall assessment. Carrying out pilot testing would assist with the establishment of broadly acceptable thresholds in the EU. Extreme values to one question should also serve as an indication that the topic may be values-laden. This rapid assessment should provide the policymaker with an indication of the extent to which it could be useful or necessary to use other tools in this Toolbox.

Fast-track identities assessment.

Just as for values, there are policies that are not primarily identity issues, and no survey or assessment will give a definite answer to how much an issue is one of identity. According to the minimal group paradigm, any shared characteristic can become an identity and can be brought into the political discourse by relevant actors. The questions below can serve as a potential guide to see if a topic is prone to being viewed through an identity lens or not, and where the identity issues might lie within the larger topic.

- Q1.** How would people view the proposal from the group perspective based on 'locality', like region, national, European, or east, west, north and south? Is it at the core of the identity or is it threatening the identity? Important dimensions of threat would be based particularly on the social status, their shared values or beliefs and whether they are considered to be vulnerable.
- On a scale of 1-5 (1 = not core to or threatening any identity; 5 = part of or threatening several identities (or particularly important ones, or very relevant/threatening for some identity)

- Q2.** How would people view the proposal from the group perspective based on 'organisational identity' like specific interest groups, political parties or movements? Is it at the core to the identity or is it threatening the identity?
- On a scale of 1-5 (1 = not core to or threatening any identity; 5 = part of or threatening several identities (or particularly important ones, or very relevant/threatening for some identity))
- Q3.** How would people view the proposal from the group perspective based on demographic/biographic identities' like age, sex/gender, language, ethnicity or religion? Is it at the core of the identity or is it threatening the identity?
- On a scale of 1-5 (1 = not core to or threatening any identity; 5 = part of or threatening several identities (or particularly important ones, or very relevant/threatening for some identity))
- Q4.** How would people view the proposal from the group perspective based on 'sectoral identity', like specific departments in government or ministries due to their professional mission, for example when dedicated to environmental protection, financial stability or the military? Is it at the core of the identity or is it threatening the identity?
- On a scale of 1-5 (1 = not core to or threatening any identity; 5 = part of or threatening several identities (or particularly important ones, or very relevant/threatening for some identity))

In general, a higher score to any of the questions will indicate a potential issue, where identity is more relevant. Aggregating these will give a good overview of the overall assessment, but extreme results to any one question should also serve as an indication that the topic is likely entangled with identity. How to proceed depends on the specific identities that are touched by the topic. To develop a policy proposal, representatives of the relevant identities should be included in the process. Additionally, even if the conflict centres on identities, conflicts are still often expressed in terms of values and many of the tools in the following section will help to deal with identity conflicts as well.

Include questions on values in citizen polling (e.g. Eurobarometer).

Another way to test for values-related relevance in a policy intervention can be based on survey data. Implementing questionnaires on values into polling such as Eurobarometer surveys, together with open questions on policy priorities, can help capture the plurality of citizens' values preferences from the outset, helping to determine political priorities. Often current analyses are restricted to averaging attitudes within countries, and pointing out differences between them, but obscuring diversity within them.

Attitudes around specific policy topics asked in public opinion research often suffer from the well-known problem that responses in surveys do not necessarily reflect the actual strength of opinions. The underlying assumption behind values research is that they are at the core of what people want, influencing downstream attitudes and opinions along with other factors, such as beliefs and norms^{109,319}. Including validated values scales into regular public opinion polling, together with specific

attitudes and opinion questions, may allow policymakers to uncover underlying psychological drivers behind certain attitudes and to investigate whether an issue presents a values conflict¹³².

Numerous values questionnaires are available with varying length and specificity:

- Schwartz' personal values questionnaire⁹⁹
- Materialist/post-materialist survey module¹³¹
- Moral Foundations survey¹¹⁴
- Morality-as-Cooperation survey³²⁰

The personal values structure can also guide general question design. The important questions involve trade-offs so people can express their relative preferences. Here there are potential conflicts between values, and thinking about these can advise question design. For example, going through the 4 higher order values of Self-transcendence, Openness to change, Self-enhancement and Conservation as a first reflection can serve to enlighten different directions beyond economic trade-offs. The infographic summarising values and identities may also help to go deeper in specifying the exact trade-offs. By focusing on the diversity of values, survey results will more likely be fit for policy purposes, helping to uncover issues that might otherwise only emerge downstream. Finally, the questions can also be used to clustering survey responses. Clustering can uncover underlying patterns between citizens' responses that would otherwise remain hidden. These clusters enable an easier grasp of commonalities and differences between large parts of populations (see the companion report revealing tribes from the dedicated Eurobarometer).



TOOL TYPE 2

Co-creation

Intended audience: Policymakers

Stage of the policy process: Preparatory

Aim: This tool comprises a number of approaches that enable optimal co-creation with citizens, scientists, stakeholders and fellow policymakers to include values and identities in the political decision-making process.

Purpose: This first step in the policy planning process defines the scope of the initiative and seeks the appropriate level of political validation to develop the idea further. It is in this phase that it is recommended that values-related considerations from different stakeholders are taken into account when relevant.

Citizen engagement (CE) to understand values diversity and break down identity barriers.

Citizen engagement, participatory and deliberative democracy techniques can be thought of along a spectrum aimed at deepening the relationship between political processes and the public. CE moves from attempts to merely inform citizens about certain policy options to letting them decide in the case of, for example, participatory budgeting. Instead of solely focusing on the final policy outcome, it helps focus on how to arrive at a policy that may garner more legitimacy in cases of values and identity conflicts.



CE techniques allow delving deeply into implicit values deliberation and resolution, breaking down identity barriers. New and emerging forms of citizen participation and engagement with democracy suggest that ostensibly opposing values can co-exist and lead to consensual policy positions. Outside elections and party politics, these new forms of participation show that values diversity and disagreement call for a consistent, on-going approach to support democracies. This requires the set of collective values and norms affecting citizens' lives to be continuously re-considered, re-discovered and re-established by political decision-makers. But which values and who decides? These are the questions that lie at the heart of policymaking and can be answered using participatory democracy and CE techniques.

CE refers to a rich spectrum of processes, practices and techniques designed to involve citizens in 'openly discussing matters of "concern" and controversy'³²¹ at different levels of public decision-making and policymaking. The most well-known formats of CE include focus groups, participatory designs, participatory modelling, scenario workshops³²², but also deliberative models such as citizen juries, panels, assemblies and consensus conferences.

CE has been actively pursued at the intersection between science, policy and society over issues such as technological development and environmental planning, where typically stakes are high and values in dispute.

In these settings, the framing of problems and their impacts are neither pre-established, nor expected to be best informed by competent experts alone. Instead, based on the diversity of perspectives, experiences, knowledge, values and imagination from participants, framing is collectively determined. CE therefore goes beyond merely 'exploring opinions and interests, or eliciting knowledge and values from participants to refine policy decisions'³²¹.

Deliberative democracy refers to specific forms of CE where co-creation can be used to address specific policy issues to find solutions to complex problems. Crucially, many forms of deliberative democracy rely on randomised sortation mechanisms in choosing participants in a representative fashion to improve social and political representation. Participants of so called 'mini publics' are then involved in a wide range of democratic innovations, such as citizens' juries, planning cells, consensus conferences, deliberative polls and citizens' assemblies¹⁶⁶. They have enjoyed ever-broader applications throughout the last 40 years and at least 700 cases have been identified to date ³²³.

DELIBERATIVE POLLING – A PROMINENT EXAMPLE

Deliberative polling aims to achieve 'reason-based public will formation', engaging a representative sample of the population in small, moderated group discussions and plenary sessions, where competing experts and policymakers answer questions and provide different perspectives and evidence. Two polls before and after this

deliberative process help to understand the public's considered judgments – that is, what the participants answer to the policy question after weighing relevant information and engaging in meaningful deliberation, instead of just answering it intuitively using 'top of the head' impressions of sound bites and headlines³²⁴.

Citizens' assemblies (CAs) bring together democracy's two core principles of representation and deliberation. The number of CAs globally are increasing as a solution to the most intricate and divisive policy challenges, such as climate change, constitutional reforms or abortion law. They consist of a representative sample of the public that is convened to consult experts and relevant stakeholders, deliberate on a respective policy issue (and sometimes define it). Subsequently, they are charged to come up with a policy proposal, usually in the course of numerous small group and plenary sessions spread across several months.

Evidence suggests that if participants positively evaluate the engagement experience, and if there is sufficient engagement from political institutions and visibility of the process from media, participatory experiences can ultimately help build the groundwork for the forms of public deliberation needed for democracy to thrive^{325,326}.

In addition to information on the JRC knowledge brokerage hub website, the JRC's Competence Centre on Participatory & Deliberative Democracy can advise on the appropriate methodologies to include in their policymaking process.

Values4Policy workshop.

Empathising with values that we do not hold is very difficult. However, workshops in which policymakers explore the variety of value orientations could be a step towards discovering their prioritised values, biases and blind spots. Through role-playing and guided discussions, policymakers learn to view a policy or a topic through various lenses in the VVV, enabling an understanding of opposing sides, as well as coming up with additional policy options and room for compromise.

While empathy in itself is not a cure for my-side bias⁶¹ or affective polarisation³²⁷, broadening knowledge about values through thought experiments may be a good step towards the incorporation of values and identities in policymaking in a more systematic way. This can also help instil humility, solidarity³²⁸, and decrease the illusion and certainty of understanding of the world and what other people want, which has been shown to contribute to people's more extreme political opinions³²⁹.


In a Values4Policy workshop, participants are asked to think and discuss a topic through the lens of multiple values, applying the VVV, some of which are not prioritised by participants themselves. While seeing the topic through the lenses, participants learn the meaning that the topic has for people who hold these values more strongly and which solutions might be preferable.

For example, on the policy issue of pollinator decline, people who highly value nature might oppose mechanical pollination solutions, even if it could save ecosystems that rely on pollinators from total collapse. On the other hand, someone who highly values Security might care more about food security, no matter how it is achieved. By going through the values systematically and discussing

- 1) the perceptions of the policy problem and
- 2) potential solutions on the table through each values lens,

results may be made future proof, incorporating values diversity and foreshadowing potential conflicts.

Figure 18: Applying the VVV to a Values4Policy workshop.



Using the personal values model, the workshop is a method for thinking through different values lenses and concerns that can open up policy options, corridors for compromise and simply develop empathy towards other perspectives. None of these methods is prescriptive of how to find a solution. In EU policymaking, policymakers could combine these with other tools in the Better Regulation Toolbox, such as the multi-criterion evaluation tool that could present rankings of solutions and potential alliances among different value concerns.

■ CASE STUDY – THE MATHEMATICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF FAIRNESS – THE CASE OF THE COMPAS ALGORITHM

In some cases, even understanding all the dimensions of values and identity concerns may not be enough to find one solution that satisfies everyone, which makes deliberation and a focus on the policy process important. For example, the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) algorithm is a commercial case management and decision support tool used by US courts to assess the likelihood of a defendant becoming a reoffender, and on that basis whether or not they should be granted bail.

How an algorithm can be fair and unfair, racially biased and racially neutral

The algorithm assigns risk scores to people ranging from 1 (low) to 10 (high) using many different inputs and indicators, making it a prime example of how Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly being used to support decision-making. The algorithm is not calibrated on the basis of racial criteria. To illustrate, scoring 7 (somewhat high) on the COMPAS scale resulted in 60% of White defendants reoffending and 61% of Black defendants reoffending. Additionally, of the defendants who received the highest risk score (10), 81% reoffended while only 22% of those who had the lowest risk score (1) reoffended, suggesting that the algorithm is fairly calibrated³³⁰.

However, among the defendants who did not reoffend, 42% of Black people were categorised as high risk, while this was only the case for 22% of White people. In short, Black people were denied bail twice as often as White people, suggesting the algorithm produced more errors for one racial group over another, resulting in potentially prejudicial treatment by the US judiciary³³⁰.

Fair calibration v fair base rates

Why was this the case? Overall, there are more Black people in the medium-high risk group than White people but the share of people placed in each risk category is the same ratio without consideration of racial background. Consequently, the algorithm – although not entirely accurate – is calibrated fairly. However, if the algorithm is to be calibrated fairly, as more Black people are assigned to the medium-high risk category it necessarily follows that more Black people overall will be erroneously denied bail than White people. This is because if the algorithm is fairly calibrated and there are unequal empirical probabilities for reoffending, it is mathematically inevitable that some groups will be treated unfairly.

What it means for policymaking and the judiciary

In light of this knowledge, much can be done to identify root causes but also how to deal with the values conflict. On the one hand, policymakers could take the opportunity to look at systemic issues tracing the reasons for variations in the empirically correct algorithm prediction. For example, arrest data is often a poor proxy for criminal activity. On the other hand, the problem of different error rates arises not in spite of, but because the algorithm is calibrated to predict the chance of an individual reoffending as fairly (empirically accurate) as possible. This is what makes efforts to be fair and unbiased at the same time so difficult. Mathematically you can satisfy one theory of fairness or the other but almost never both^{331,332}.

There are normative judgements at play here. Therefore, open, transparent debates about values are necessary and premature assumptions based on one's own values should be avoided. In this

case, there are important differences between equal treatment on the individual level and equitable outcomes on the group level, which cannot be solved at the technical, machine-learning / AI level³³³.

From a personal values perspective, two different instantiations (fair as empirically accurate and

fair as group-level treatment) of the same value, Universalism, are in an unresolvable conflict with each other. In addition, this is entangled with the dimension of racial identity, where favouring one fair solution over the other can be seen as discrimination. Accordingly, this case would be an excellent subject for a Tool 2 Co-creation approach.

Strategic Foresight incorporating values.

Values are important determinants of the evolution of societies. As such, they are an important element to take into account when reflecting on the future. One way to incorporate these reflections into the political decision-making process is through strategic foresight, the role of which has been recognised as increasingly important in EU policymaking. Its applicability to policy issues derives from its systematic, participatory process, building future intelligence with a medium-to-long-term perspective aimed at improving present-day decisions.

The most widely used framework to help participants in foresight processes to take a holistic perspective is the STEEPV framework (Social, Technological, Environmental, Economic, Political and Values)³³⁴. It is used to identify the various factors that will drive the evolution of a given system and demonstrates that the foresight community considers values among the most significant drivers of change, regardless of the system being studied (e.g. a city, a country, a company, a technology, etc.). However, participants in foresight processes have generally a limited understanding of values and foresight professionals have not developed standard tools to use values in foresight. This prevents the discussion on values choices and trade-offs at a depth needed for such an important topic. This tool would increase significantly the explicit use of values in foresight practice and draw on the values spectrum with the greatest empirical validity and predictive power about what citizens want.

Two main concrete applications of such tools in the use of foresight for policymaking could be:

1. a 'values explainer' to enhance the STEEPV framework, especially for application during a scenario-building workshop. This tool would provide people engaged in the identification of the key drivers of change for a given system to have a better understanding of how values can influence the behaviour of individuals and groups and what tensions can exist between these values. Such a tool should consist of an easy-to-use template derived from the personal values and identity considerations presented in this report. Conservatism, Openness to change or social

orientation of Self-transcendence are typical factors that often come to the fore in foresight scenario-building and a 'values explainer' would increase the robustness of the discussions when, for example, discussing the relative importance of various drivers of change.

2. a 'values detector' to reveal the role of values and social identities when using scenarios to stress test policies or explore the consequences of specific scenarios on selected issues. In this case, the tool should consist of a set of standard questions to help policymakers detect which values are dominant, and which social identities are highly affected. Thereafter, potential values and group conflicts in each scenario can be identified.

In collaboration with experts on foresight, such as those in the JRC's EU Policy Lab, the systematic inclusion of either the 2 main value dimensions (conflicts of cooperation and group conflict) or the 4 higher order personal values (Self-enhancement, Self-transcendence, Openness to change and Conservation) could be included in scenario-building and vision-building activities.



TOOL TYPE 3

Communication

Intended audience: Policymakers

Stage of the policy process: Preparatory, Implementation & Application

Aim: To optimally communicate and understand the ramifications and interpretations of key messages and media coverage of policy issues in terms of values and identities.

Purpose: This tool comprises 2 approaches that enable optimal uptake of communication messages and novel media monitoring analysis techniques to determine a values equivalent to sentiment analysis.

Communication case study examples using framing with values

Effective communication can help establish legitimate connections between values and policies and potentially gain support from citizens if framed appealingly. Framing, the way information is presented through a specific angle, is never neutral but has a potentially large impact on how people perceive an issue³³⁵. Policymakers and communicators will have to choose one or multiple frames, but this places an ethical burden of responsibility on the policymaker about the legitimate use of such communication techniques. This subject will be addressed in detail in the next Enlightenment 2.0 report that is dedicated to the ethical components of meaningful political communication. In the meantime, this section demonstrates possible uses through means of case studies.

Attempting to persuade someone who holds different values to change their mind (or even change their values) largely fails because persuaders typically stick to their own value frames instead of arguing

their case using the values of their audience^{114,336,337}. Employing values in communication can make policies look more attractive but its power is limited and should be used ethically³³⁸.

Communication advice on the use of ‘common values’ dates back to Aristotle. However, information is often lacking on what these values actually are³³⁹. This report has presented a systematic values framework with personal values. Citizens value most personal values to some degree, providing reassurance to policymakers that on non-controversial topics, their communications can be broadly appealing and generic in nature. Nevertheless, as outlined in the previous chapters, some personal values have an in-built tension, which comes into play on controversial topics such as migration or climate change. In these cases it is important to understand what the underlying conflicting values are, and the policymaker can check the following:

- 1) Who is the audience?
- 2) What is the policy goal?

Regarding the audience, communications can be directed at the general population, or at targeted sub-groups, which is often practiced today but should always be done openly and transparently⁷³. If the communication targets either a sub-group or a specific behaviour, values communication can be adapted to the audience to be more successful³⁴⁰. Persuasion research shows that ‘matching’ an argument to the values associated with the recipient’s concerns is important³⁴¹. If the communication is directed at a general audience, then value-specific communication is more difficult and can potentially lead to increased polarisation because both sides assimilate information in contrary ways and see opposing values as grounds for disagreement (myside bias)^{342,343}. The question should be: who is most likely to be convinced and what is the legitimacy of specifically targeting their values profile? This will likely vary from topic to topic.

Regarding the policy goal, many policies intend to get citizens or organisations to change a specific behaviour, such as stopping the use of plastic straws, engage in car sharing or reporting taxes in a timely fashion. It is often believed that people have to be convinced on factual grounds to change their behaviour, for example that climate change is affected by human activity. However, many studies show that convincing arguments based upon facts do not result in attitude change^{344,345}. Several of these intended behaviours or attitudes have a direct connection to values, e.g. car sharing or energy-reducing behaviour links to the value of Universalism (nature) in the personal value circle. Connecting such a behaviour to the motivationally opposing values of power and wealth may help to promote this specific behaviour among those prioritising these values.

Similar arguments have been made in relation to the Moral Foundations Theory^{336,337,346}, where the use of the endorsed (moral) values of the opposing side has proven remarkably effective. In the USA, ‘moral reframing’ around polarised topics such as economic inequality, environmental protection, same-sex marriage and major party candidates for the presidency have been influential. This has resulted in appeals to support same-sex marriage of normally opposing citizens in terms of the patriotism value, for example ‘Gay Americans are proud and patriotic Americans’, instead of the equality value, for example ‘Gay Americans deserve equal rights’³³⁷.

Further research is needed in this field to establish the consistency of this relationship over time³⁴⁷ or create unwanted spill-overs into other behaviours³⁴⁸.

Social identities also matter in addition to the identification of the messenger as a member of an in- or out-group and their specific values reputation. One of the main reasons why people hold their beliefs and attitudes is because they want to belong to a group and trust the members of the group to have their best intentions at heart. This has further implications for communication, as the messenger needs to check whether the communication threatens a specific group or the main beliefs of a group or affirms it. In the previous chapter, a recent survey on important identities at EU level was detailed, where family and nationality score highest for most Europeans. The identities can serve as a useful checklist to communication professionals.

VALUE FRAMES IN CLIMATE CHANGE

In the past, the climate crisis has frequently been linked to values such as social justice, animal welfare or inequality of consumption. These values are all closely related to Self-transcendence values in the personal values circle³⁴⁷. By focusing on this value dimension, it has become an important issue to citizens high in Self-transcendence values and something that needs to be acted upon urgently. At the same time, citizens high on Self-enhancement values have come to see actions targeted to stop the climate crisis as an attack on their values such as Power wealth and Hedonism. These effects seem to be driven through the political framing of values to policies resulting in polarisation between the political left and right. In particular, the higher the salience of one's political identity, the higher the differences in perceptions about man-made climate change³⁴⁹. A common response to this dilemma is to adopt citizen segmentation strategies to target people's value pre-dispositions, i.e. tailoring the messages to the prioritised values of the person. This approach is, however, criticised as leading to only narrow and short-term success. This can compromise the overall value of the policy initiative and have negative spill-over effects onto other behaviours that are intended to be enhanced³⁴⁸.

Solutions – People usually hold all values to some degree, even if they prioritise others. Appeals to the opposing values should therefore be limited and the consistent value should be chosen.

At the same time, the value circle shows that there is more than one dimension to values and each behaviour can be seen through several lenses. It is worth considering engaging at least two different dimensions of values. To illustrate, for the climate crisis example, the scientific literature shows that the values of Security, community (in-group) and purity, which all relate closely to Conservation, seem to reach people who have different priorities of values; therefore appeals to these values can maximise the effect that communication can have^{346,350,351}. Similar examples can be found around immigration³³⁹.



HOW TO USE A VALUES TEXT-MINING TOOL

Marie and Jean are working on a proposal to legislate against a dangerous chemical, which non-professionals use to dilute indoor paint. There is an equally efficient alternative that is less dangerous.

Before publishing anything about the initiative, they run a values media analysis and find most people express values of Tradition, Power, Self-direction and Security with regards to this chemical. Upon reading some texts selected by the algorithm, they understand that private users of this chemical either warn about the health hazards or feel that they can deal with the possible problems themselves and are entitled to renovate their houses with whichever tools they like. Marie and Jean had expected these sentiments. In addition, they find that there is a small yet active community of hobbyists in one EU Member

State, who carve traditional wood figurines and treat them with the very same chemical to achieve a special matt finish.

Before publishing their legislative proposal, Marie and Jean ensure that an equivalent replacement product to create the matt finish is available for the hobbyists. In the speech that they write for the Commissioner to present the initiative, they make sure to address Tradition, Security, Self-direction and Power. For example, they portray it as positive if people renovate their homes themselves and stress that the Commission intends to ensure they can do so safely. They also specifically mention the traditional wood-carving practice and the availability of replacement products. They can check that they have hit their mark by running their draft speech through the values text-mining tool.

Furthermore, while the personal values framework presented here is considered universal, how values translate to actions are culture-specific. Value instantiations, i.e. how a value is interpreted locally, can vary between cultures. In a multicultural organisation such as the European Commission, it is important that policymakers understand and consider these grass root differences. Any team of policymakers working on a specific legislative file will invariably be too small to ensure cultural awareness by representation of all Member States. Analysing culture-specific texts, such as traditional and online media, could help overcome this deficit and ensure that values and their specific cultural instantiations be taken into account when drafting a new policy.

Big data analysis does not replace valued Member State relations, polling data or the approaches outlined under Tool 2 Co-creation. It can, however, assist with getting initiatives positively off the ground and with an understanding of how political figures have the potential to frame the debate and shape opinion, serving as an early indicator of policy frames. Frames are often simplified into two dominant ways of thinking about an issue³⁵⁴. It can be important to track this frame simplification over time, as there may be virtue in preventing this process from occurring. Continuing to advance multiple frames may be a way to guard against simplistic polarisation

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Policymakers have to constantly work with values diversity.
- At its core, liberal democracy is about negotiating values and 'all policymaking and governance, local and global, is about efforts to find shared guiding values, deliberate and come to a common ground'.³¹²
- If values are in opposition in a specific policy, successful resolution may not only focus on the outcome, but also the way it was achieved.
- As an overarching approach, a 'Various Values View' (VVV), which looks at a specific policy problem through different values lenses, could help improve policymaking.
- Values are relevant to understand a policy question or problem, frame the policy options, assess the impact of possible solutions, evaluate the outcome of an adopted measure and communicate better.
- Three tools are proposed to assist policymakers in considering values and identities in policymaking



TOOL TYPE 1. - Heightened understanding, contains:

- Discover one's own values priorities and values blind spots using a survey.
- Use a Fast-track Values Assessment to identify whether a policy is highly value-laden.
- Use a Fast-track Identities Assessment to identify whether a policy is highly identity-laden.
- Include questions on values in citizen polling (e.g. Eurobarometer) to uncover underlying psychological drivers of opinions and attitudes.




TOOL TYPE 2.- Co-creation, contains:

- Use Citizen Engagement and Deliberative Democracy processes to understand values diversity, particular issue frames diversity and break down identity barriers.
- Employ a Values4Policy workshop to learn about and discover how policy problems and proposed solutions can be perceived through different values lenses
- Use Strategic Foresight incorporating values, employing a values explainer and values detector to uncover diverse values-driven scenarios.



TOOL TYPE 3. - Communication

- Communicate using values frames for effective communication, but consider the ethical implications.
- Employ a values text-mining and media-monitoring tool to learn about one's own values in relation to communication habits and about the way citizens express their values around policy topics.



FUTURE OUTLOOK AND RESEARCH AGENDA

This report has outlined how policymakers can understand different values and how they relate to different identities of citizens. Values are especially stable at the individual level, but change, albeit slowly, at the societal level. Many studies explain this by modernisation theory – increased economic and physical security and education in post-industrial societies. On this basis, the increasing inequalities and various crises that have weighed heavily on individuals' sense of security in recent years raise the question of whether at some point, especially for young people facing more economic and psychological hardship, changes to the priorities of values from the last decades may reverse. The consequences for democracies are difficult to predict, but if polarisation and democratic backsliding are any indication, then it seems vital to keep a closer eye on this development in the future.

The question of value change also highlights the urgent need to know more about polarisation in countries outside of the USA and in the EU in particular. While much research is US-based due to a combination of data availability, research prowess and publication strategies, many other countries also face these issues but are less well researched. The importing of economic and cultural conflicts from the USA into other parts of the world, via social media and other technologies, has been well documented, which is a problem if these conflicts obscure the real conflicts in other democracies.

For democracies to find ways to deal with multiple political cleavages efficiently and in a trustworthy way will be a major challenge.

Polarisation in the EU is perceived to be relevant, but the picture is patchy. Knowing more about the state of polarisation and the drivers of it in the EU is all the more important because even the perception of polarisation can weaken democracies by producing increased affective polarisation. In addition, an important driver of polarisation in the USA, the two-party political system, where party elites wield significant influence over citizen-level polarisation through partisanship, is not present in most countries in the EU. At this stage all extrapolations from the USA to the EU from the literature have therefore been interpreted with caution, but no evidence on a phenomenon does not mean the absence of that phenomenon.

Furthermore, with the transformation to modern pluralist and globalised societies, the report has shown that the political cleavage from the economic left-right has been complemented or even supplemented with the cultural cleavage dimension. Some studies also claim that a populist-elite cleavage has become a third large-scale dimension of political conflict. These changes complicate political landscapes for policymakers, parties and citizens alike, because a strong stance on one dimension may not be compatible with the other dimension, leading many to finding no political home and parties finding it harder to assemble a consistent manifesto.

It may also lead to much more rapid political swings, if large-scale real-life events such as climate catastrophes, migration flows or civil unrest change the salient political dimension. For democracies to find ways to deal with multiple political cleavages efficiently and in a trustworthy way will be a major challenge. It is also not unthinkable that further cleavages may emerge in the future.

Is policymaking prepared for these changes? Democracies are usually well suited to respond to major challenges quickly, not because it is a machine but because so many people are involved in constantly adapting. This report seeks to provide a contribution to clarifying current challenges and proposing some solutions that should be further developed. Scientists also face similar challenges when it comes to overcoming their own myside bias based on their particular values and group identities as research communities, especially when it comes to giving policy advice. Researchers and research organisations can equally employ the methods outlined in the previous chapter to check for blind spots, for example when deciding what to fund or investigate, how to interpret results and how to transform this into policy advice when needing to make the interpretative leap.

As a research organisation, the JRC will also continue its work in this field:

- The JRC will continue to develop the Toolbox proposed in this third report from its Enlightenment 2.0 Project. The next major report will address how to use values and identities, among other concepts, to better communicate science and policies in an ethical way (*'Meaningful and Ethical Communication'*), answering the question: How can those who seek to uphold liberal democracies ensure their communication resonates with citizens without resorting to the manipulative tactics used by those who seek to undermine liberal democracy? How can communication be both meaningful and ethical? Where are the acceptable parameters in framing with values and identities? Significant research is needed to analyse the many variables of meaningful communication for different audiences with the aim of establishing an interdisciplinary framework that includes (but is not limited to) frames, values, identities, narratives, metaphors and causal reasoning in environments with high and low levels of uncertainty.
- Within the project, the JRC will also tackle whether appealing to people's priorities given to certain values works in all areas, does not produce negative spillovers into other unwanted behaviours and is normatively appropriate. If people have specific value priorities, is a policymaker allowed to appeal to them, irrespective of the content of the policy, or can we define boundaries for legitimate appeals?

Additionally, in the course of writing the report, some issues around values and identities for policymaking have been identified that require greater attention by researchers and then translation into policymaking needs. The research community and civil society organisations are invited to address the most urgent of them:

- The personal values approach has become the gold standard in values research. However, tests of the approach have more strongly focused on validating the structure of the values, with a good

track record, but less so the completeness of values. For policymaking, especially in culturally diverse settings such as the EU, future work should seek to test whether other values are still missing and whether country-specific values – if they exist – have an important influence. The value instantiation need, i.e. the connection between values, attitudes and actions for values to become meaningful speaks to the culturally-specific dimension. Knowing more about the instantiation process, especially in the European cultural context, would help close this gap and make the insights more applicable to policymaking.

- The influence of much in life and specifically of values and identities seems to rely on their relative salience. Given their societal relevance, the causes of variation in issue salience however remain under-theorised and are rarely tested, with potential for fundamental change in social media and online environments.
- The influence of partisanship on values and attitudes and vice versa in the context of non-binary political systems, different to the USA, seems to be understudied but very important for policymaking in multi-party political systems.
- While this report stresses the need to adapt policymaking to values diversity, values do change at the individual level, especially in the early years. Policymakers may be interested in affecting values change as well, but values change at the individual level seems an understudied area needing more attention. The establishment of cohort panels for values with repeated observation of the same individuals across countries over time could help. The ethics of seeking to change individual values in this context should be further studied.
- Finally, as the evidence landscape expands, governance institutions increasingly need to include not only scientific and economic evidence in their decision-making but also outcomes from

other types of evidence; e.g. citizen engagement initiatives to uncover values, or foresight processes. There is a need to help policymakers make optimal use of evidence by clarifying the differences and qualities of the types of evidence. A weighting of the different evidence types according to their merits to the situation would have to be developed. In turn, this would enable insights on trade-offs, resulting in a meaningful level of transparency across the political decision-making process, differentiating evidence-related decisions from other legitimate factors.

KEY IMPLICATIONS:

- Today, many people, and especially the young, are facing economic and psychological hardship, meaning that changes to the priorities of values from the last decades may reverse.
- The question of value change also highlights the urgent need to know more about polarisation in countries outside of the USA and in the EU in particular.
- For democracies to find ways to deal with multiple political cleavages efficiently and in a trustworthy way will be a major challenge. It is also not unthinkable that further cleavages may emerge in the future.
- The JRC will also continue its work in this field, particularly with research on how to communicate meaningfully and ethically as a policymaker.

GLOSSARY

Below we provide a list of key terms we need to differentiate for the descriptions to come. For each of these terms there are a variety of definitions in the social sciences that often contradict one another, if not on the overall scope, then on a variety of details. We therefore provide a list of non-technical terminologies we use in this report to maximise the common understanding. If necessary, we delineate them from our approach to values and identities.

- **Values:** Abstract goals or motivations that are important in many situation, such as Freedom, Tolerance or Security. The report differentiates between personal values perspectives that apply to the individual and to group values – the prevailing personal values within the group. When talking about values diversity, this report refers to the hierarchy over the various values mentioned.
- **Identities:** The groups a person feels he/she belongs to, for example based on nationality, party or occupation. Social identities can be based on any category of social relevance. Everyone always has multiple identities, but only a few of them will be relevant at any one time.
- **Beliefs:** The idea of how true something is. Example: ‘The virus COVID-19 exists’ or ‘Germany has the highest population in the EU’. Beliefs vary in the strength of our belief in the truth, like a subjective probability. When people want beliefs to be true, we describe them as convictions. Unlike beliefs, values refer to needs or goals people want to attain, for example a person wants to achieve or see equality in society, while he or she can believe that ‘There is no equality between men and women in our society’.
- **World views:** World views are sets of beliefs (see comment above) and assumptions that are perceived to describe reality. A world view is a way of describing the world and life within it, both in terms of what is and what ought to be. World views represent a person's or a culture's answers to fundamental existential questions.
- **Attitudes:** These are evaluations of people, behaviours, policies, events or any other object as good or bad, or desirable or undesirable. In the realm of politics, they are sometimes called issue positions. Attitudes are therefore the expression of values applied to specific issues. Examples are: Is a higher income tax good or bad? Whereas there are a limited number of core values or value orientations, attitudes are potentially infinite. Classically, surveys ask for a large battery of attitudes towards specific issues, while the theories of values can be used to structure into categories.
- **Preferences:** Individual preferences are relative judgements or leanings between different objects that should generate a ranking order between them. The preferences are based on the attribution of a value to each option, which is presumed to guide individuals' choices between these options. Put simply, preferences are what people want.

- **Norms:** Norms are rules or standards for behaviour of a member of a group or society. Examples are: Is it acceptable to jaywalk? How much money should be spent on a gift to a colleague or friend? Should I save more energy at home? There are a number of different types of norms, depending on the specificity and group that sets the norm, whether it is society at large or the specific social group one identifies with. The difference between values and norms is that norms are about specific behaviours, while values are trans-situational and therefore do not define exactly what to do.
- **Traits:** Personality traits are tendencies of thought, feelings and behaviour across situations. While some traits can also be expressed as values, values are always desirable for a person but traits are potentially not. Traits are therefore who people are, while values are who people want to be.
- **Polarisation:** A form of extreme political disagreement. It can be based on either concrete attitudes or opinions towards a specific policy issue (issue polarisation) or based on the dislike of the political opponent (affective polarisation). Both types can be relevant for all parts of society or only the elites.
- **Identity politics:** Identity politics can be defined as the view of politics through one or more particular social identity lenses, where the interests are focused around that identity. Identity politics can involve many different identities, because every social category or characteristic can become the source of an identity and therefore of an in-group cohesion and out-group bias.

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