In this paper we extend the analysis of the standard model of spatial discrimination with quantity competition along the linear city to the case in which the unit transportation cost is greater than one. We show that in such a case the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in locations is a dispersed symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, at this equilibrium firms' locations are not monotone in the transportation cost parameter. Codice Scopus: 2-s2.0-34548858164
Spatial discrimination with quantity competition and high transportation costs: A note
CHIRCO, Alessandra;SCRIMITORE, Marcella
2007-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we extend the analysis of the standard model of spatial discrimination with quantity competition along the linear city to the case in which the unit transportation cost is greater than one. We show that in such a case the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in locations is a dispersed symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, at this equilibrium firms' locations are not monotone in the transportation cost parameter. Codice Scopus: 2-s2.0-34548858164File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
