The effects of the crisis have occurred to a lesser extent on the loan portfolio of cooperative banks. The paper aims to explain whether and to what extent the characteristics of cooperative banking governance have contributed to this result. Along with traditional measures of corporate governance, the empirical analysis suggests some proxies of peer monitoring effect, typically present in the cooperative banking model. The results of the analysis, conducted on a sample of 45 Italian cooperative banks in the period 2007-2009, show that the governance arrangements contribute to support better business performance and, specifically, the bank’s ability to finance customers characterized by a lower credit risk. Based on these results, some managerial implications are proposed.
Governance and Peer Monitoring in Co-Operative Banks. Empirical Evidence on Portfolio Credit Risk
BOSCIA, Vittorio;V. Stefanelli
2012-01-01
Abstract
The effects of the crisis have occurred to a lesser extent on the loan portfolio of cooperative banks. The paper aims to explain whether and to what extent the characteristics of cooperative banking governance have contributed to this result. Along with traditional measures of corporate governance, the empirical analysis suggests some proxies of peer monitoring effect, typically present in the cooperative banking model. The results of the analysis, conducted on a sample of 45 Italian cooperative banks in the period 2007-2009, show that the governance arrangements contribute to support better business performance and, specifically, the bank’s ability to finance customers characterized by a lower credit risk. Based on these results, some managerial implications are proposed.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
