This paper presents a model of centralisation, where the decision to centralise policy is based on the subsidiarity principle. It shows how and when strategic delegation incentives facilitate the misallocation of public goods. We argue that less subsidiarity is desirable when decentralised governments use the subsidiarity principle to force distorted policies.
Strategic delegation under the subsidiarity principle
GIURANNO, MICHELE GIUSEPPE
2014-01-01
Abstract
This paper presents a model of centralisation, where the decision to centralise policy is based on the subsidiarity principle. It shows how and when strategic delegation incentives facilitate the misallocation of public goods. We argue that less subsidiarity is desirable when decentralised governments use the subsidiarity principle to force distorted policies.File in questo prodotto:
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