At some point, the author of The Golden Bough “became conscious” that he had overlooked the “real foundations of his research”. In this remark Wittgenstein probably refers to Frazer’s self-criticism: the Scottish anthropologist attributes unambiguous precedence to his ‘collections of facts’ over his theories and downplays the importance of the ‘official’ principal problem of his book. Does Wittgenstein realize the concordance between his criticism and Frazer’s self-assessment? And does Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘perspicuous representation’, even though it contains a criticism of Frazer, still follow too closely the ‘comparative method’ of evolutionary anthropology? Gordon Baker denies that Wittgenstein ever thinks of the possibility of giving a ‘perspicuous representation’ of religious rituals. Taking a partly critical stance with regard to Baker’s thesis, I throw new light on Wittgenstein’s intentions. Possible foci for a perspicuous representation are (a) Frazer’s ‘collection of facts’ or (b) the ‘transformations of meaning’ in ritual customs and/or in language. In TS 211 the emphasis is placed on (b). What would a perspicuous representation of ‘Frazer’s collection of facts’ (a) show? Wittgenstein, following Goethe, explains: “And so the choir points to a mysterious law”. He is arguing against Frazer that this is not a hypothetical, empirical, causal, evolutionary-historical law. Are we dealing with a formal universal human ‘principle’ according to which ritual customs are ‘ordered’? On this point the remarks in MS 110 are ambiguous. Moore’s notes on the lectures of May 1933 demonstrate that Wittgenstein develops these critical considerations further. With regard to the ‘choir’ of Frazerian customs, he claims “That they point, is all there is to it”.
“That they point, is all there is to it.” Wittgenstein, Frazer, eine „Tatsachensammlung“ und ihre „übersichtliche Darstellung“
Brusotti, Marco
2016-01-01
Abstract
At some point, the author of The Golden Bough “became conscious” that he had overlooked the “real foundations of his research”. In this remark Wittgenstein probably refers to Frazer’s self-criticism: the Scottish anthropologist attributes unambiguous precedence to his ‘collections of facts’ over his theories and downplays the importance of the ‘official’ principal problem of his book. Does Wittgenstein realize the concordance between his criticism and Frazer’s self-assessment? And does Wittgenstein’s idea of a ‘perspicuous representation’, even though it contains a criticism of Frazer, still follow too closely the ‘comparative method’ of evolutionary anthropology? Gordon Baker denies that Wittgenstein ever thinks of the possibility of giving a ‘perspicuous representation’ of religious rituals. Taking a partly critical stance with regard to Baker’s thesis, I throw new light on Wittgenstein’s intentions. Possible foci for a perspicuous representation are (a) Frazer’s ‘collection of facts’ or (b) the ‘transformations of meaning’ in ritual customs and/or in language. In TS 211 the emphasis is placed on (b). What would a perspicuous representation of ‘Frazer’s collection of facts’ (a) show? Wittgenstein, following Goethe, explains: “And so the choir points to a mysterious law”. He is arguing against Frazer that this is not a hypothetical, empirical, causal, evolutionary-historical law. Are we dealing with a formal universal human ‘principle’ according to which ritual customs are ‘ordered’? On this point the remarks in MS 110 are ambiguous. Moore’s notes on the lectures of May 1933 demonstrate that Wittgenstein develops these critical considerations further. With regard to the ‘choir’ of Frazerian customs, he claims “That they point, is all there is to it”.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.