How do we know the position and movements of our limbs? Wittgenstein repeatedly deals with one received answer to this epistemological question: our ‘kinaesthetic sensations’ teach us about our posture and movements. However, he does not reject only this specific solution. He puts into question the very idea of an epistemology of bodily awareness. His critical arguments are not simply reductionist, but neither are they “mainly introspective”, and nor does he lean towards a “perceptual view” (Harcourt). The paper also touches upon the issue of how Wittgenstein's views relate to Anscombe’s much discussed claim that one ordinarily knows the position of one’s limbs “without observation”.
“Knowing our own Body? Wittgenstein and the epistemology of bodily self-experience”
Marco Brusotti
2019-01-01
Abstract
How do we know the position and movements of our limbs? Wittgenstein repeatedly deals with one received answer to this epistemological question: our ‘kinaesthetic sensations’ teach us about our posture and movements. However, he does not reject only this specific solution. He puts into question the very idea of an epistemology of bodily awareness. His critical arguments are not simply reductionist, but neither are they “mainly introspective”, and nor does he lean towards a “perceptual view” (Harcourt). The paper also touches upon the issue of how Wittgenstein's views relate to Anscombe’s much discussed claim that one ordinarily knows the position of one’s limbs “without observation”.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
