Jacques Derrida opens his Histoire du mensonge (1997) with a famous pas sage from Friedrich Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols: «How the ‘true world’ finally became a fable. The history of an error». Derrida defines this brief excursus into the history of philosophy as a «fabulous narration about a fable»: how, in fact, can one believe in the truth of the narration about a supposed "true world", which is itself a fable? In this sort of vicious circle, Derrida's aim is to develop a deconstruc tive genealogy of the concept of lying, and therefore of truthfulness: in this pro- cess, the influence of Nietzsche is significant, not to say decisive; Nietzsche, for whom «error regarding life [is] necessary to life» (Human, All Too Human 33) and who dedicates the first of his philosophical writings to On Truth and Lie in an Ex tra-moral Sense. The aim of this article will therefore be to examine Nietzsche's considerations on lying and error in the light of his extraordinary defining capaci ties. While it is true that lying, deception, deceit and error all fall into the category of the pseudological, Nietzsche was clear about what distinguishes them, what their ontological nature is and above all what consequences they have had and still have in the moral, religious, sociological and political spheres.
Errore, menzogna e finzione tra Nietzsche e Derrida
Maria Cristina Fornari
2021-01-01
Abstract
Jacques Derrida opens his Histoire du mensonge (1997) with a famous pas sage from Friedrich Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols: «How the ‘true world’ finally became a fable. The history of an error». Derrida defines this brief excursus into the history of philosophy as a «fabulous narration about a fable»: how, in fact, can one believe in the truth of the narration about a supposed "true world", which is itself a fable? In this sort of vicious circle, Derrida's aim is to develop a deconstruc tive genealogy of the concept of lying, and therefore of truthfulness: in this pro- cess, the influence of Nietzsche is significant, not to say decisive; Nietzsche, for whom «error regarding life [is] necessary to life» (Human, All Too Human 33) and who dedicates the first of his philosophical writings to On Truth and Lie in an Ex tra-moral Sense. The aim of this article will therefore be to examine Nietzsche's considerations on lying and error in the light of his extraordinary defining capaci ties. While it is true that lying, deception, deceit and error all fall into the category of the pseudological, Nietzsche was clear about what distinguishes them, what their ontological nature is and above all what consequences they have had and still have in the moral, religious, sociological and political spheres.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
