Thing and Space in Husserl (and Heidegger)

The phenomenological reason shows how the space and the thing conceived by the scientific and natural thinking are a construction upon the unitary and meaningful world of everyday experience; therefore the aim of this essaylk is to analyse, from an Husserlian point of view, the most foundational layers of “space” and “thing” beginning from the most fundamental stratum, called by Husserl “phantom”, the mere res extensa, and arriving at kinaesthetic fields in which the apprehensional character of the things depends from the interplay of sequences of K’s (kinaesthetic circumstances) and i’s (correlative images) which blend into a unitary and meaningful system of experience. In order to better understand Husserl’s notions of thing and space, the last part of this essay is concerned about a different conception of the same concepts in Heidegger. Indirect confrontation with Heidegger, namely, allows to find some critical and weak points in Husserl’s analysis of thing and space.