In the paper a game between private and public individuals is set in order to study under which conditions the former would like to limit ex-ante the choices of the latter. Ambiguity, as distinguished from risk, is explicitly introduced by means of capacities and Choquet Expected Utility. It is shown that constitutional constraints are necessary to prevent private individuals from being exploited by public individuals whenever citizens feel a too high level of ambiguity.
Constitutional Constraints under Ambiguity: a Game-Theoretic Approach
FONTINI, FULVIO
2007-01-01
Abstract
In the paper a game between private and public individuals is set in order to study under which conditions the former would like to limit ex-ante the choices of the latter. Ambiguity, as distinguished from risk, is explicitly introduced by means of capacities and Choquet Expected Utility. It is shown that constitutional constraints are necessary to prevent private individuals from being exploited by public individuals whenever citizens feel a too high level of ambiguity.File in questo prodotto:
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